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CONFRONTING THE CRISIS IN SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING:
LATENCY, LICENSING AND ACCESS

Jorge L. Contreras*
ABSTRACT
The serials crisis in scientific publishing can be traced to the long duration of
copyright protection and the assignment of copyright by researchers to publishers.
Over-protection of scientific literature has enabled commercial publishers to
increase subscription rates to a point at which access to scientific information has
been curtailed with negative social welfare consequences. The uniformity costs
imposed by such over-protection can be addressed by tailoring intellectual property
rights, either through legal change or private ordering.
Current open access channels of distribution offer alternative approaches to
scientific publishing, but neither the Green OA self-archiving nor the Gold OA
author-pays models has yet achieved widespread acceptance. Moreover, recent
proposals to abolish copyright protection for academic works, while theoretically
attractive, may be difficult to implement in view of current legislative and judicial
dispositions. Likewise, funder open access mandates such as the NIH OA Policy,
which are already responsible for the public release of millions of scientific
articles, are susceptible to various risks and political uncertainty.
In this article, I propose an alternative private ordering solution based on latency
values observed in open access stakeholder negotiation settings. Under this
proposal, research institutions would collectively develop and adopt publication
agreements that do not transfer copyright ownership to publishers, but instead
grant publishers a one-year exclusive period in which to publish a work. This
limited period of exclusivity should enable the publisher to recoup its costs and a
reasonable profit through subscription revenues, while restoring control of the
article copyright to the author at the end of the exclusivity period. This balanced
approach addresses the needs of both publishers and the scientific community, and
would, I believe, avoid many of the challenges faced by existing open access
models.
*
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2012, more than 5,700 individuals boycotted a leading
multinational corporation and successfully derailed a legislative initiative
that would have significantly benefitted the industry. Who were the
individuals responsible for this remarkable demonstration of grassroots
political muscle? Environmental activists? Opponents of corporate
globalization? Self-proclaimed representatives of the “99%”? No, the group
that successfully stared down this multi-billion dollar global enterprise
consisted mostly of mathematicians and other natural scientists. The focus
of their boycott: Elsevier, the world’s largest publisher of scientific
journals.1
Led by some of the most prominent names in mathematics, the
protesters objected to Elsevier’s spiraling prices and its push to abolish a
policy whereby scientific articles funded by the U.S. National Institutes of
Health (NIH) are made publicly-available.2 The boycott pressured Elsevier
to withdraw its support for the bill, called the Research Works Act, and
ultimately led to its demise.3 Though the proposed Research Works Act was
the immediate cause of the Elsevier boycott, the uprising by scientists is
symptomatic of a much deeper and longer conflict within the scientific
community. As observed by Ingrid Daubechies, president of the
International Mathematical Union, the boycott arose because the “social
compact [between scientists and publishers] is broken”.4
In the 1940s, sociologist Robert K. Merton famously identified four
fundamental norms that characterize both the practice and culture of
science. Among these is the willingness of scientists to share their
discoveries and findings freely.5 While the motivations that lead scientists
to share, as well as the practical difficulties inherent in this activity, have
been debated since Merton’s day, there is little argument that the
accessibility of scientific findings is critical to the advancement of scientific
progress.6 As Merton observes, there is a strong need for later scientists to

Thomas Lin, Mathematicians Organize Boycott of a Publisher, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2012.
2 Research Works Act (H.R. 3699) introduced in the House by Representatives Issa
and Maloney on December 16, 2011.
3 The bill’s co-sponsors withdrew it in February 2012. See Legislation to Bar PublicAccess Requirement on Federal Research is Dead, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Feb. 27, 2012.
4 Lin, supra note 1.
5 Robert K. Merton, “The Normative Structure of Science (1942)” in The Sociology of
Science 267-78 (Norman W. Storer, ed., 1973).
6 Such acknowledgements abound in the literature. See, e.g., Scott Aaronson, et al., The
Cost of Knowledge (Feb. 2012) (statement of 34 prominent mathematicians protesting
the
practices
of
Elsevier)
(available
at
http://gowers.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/elsevierstatementfinal.pdf).
1
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build upon the work and ideas of their predecessors.7 Without a cumulative
process of this nature, science would not advance, making such sharing
necessary to the practice of science itself. 8 In addition to advancing
scientific progress, the sharing of scientific data enables scientists to
validate and independently verify the findings, analyses and conclusions of
their colleagues. 9 Recent instances of scientific fraud and misconduct
underscore the need for critical and independent review of scientific
claims.10
Consequently, many benefits of scientific research – improvements to
health, agriculture, infrastructure and industry – may also be said to flow
from the ability of scientists to share and build upon one another’s
knowledge. By enabling scientific advancement, the sharing of scientific
information may be said to contribute to overall social welfare. 11 But
In this respect, Merton relies upon Sir Isaac Newton’s apocryphal observation, “If I
have seen farther it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.” Merton, Normative
Structure, supra note 5, at 274-75. Cf. ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A
SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (1965).
8 See DIGITAL ARCHIVING CONSULTANCY ET AL., LARGE-SCALE DATA SHARING IN THE LIFE
SCIENCES: DATA STANDARDS, INCENTIVES, BARRIERS AND FUNDING MODELS 11 (Aug. 2005)
(hereinafter “JOINT DATA STANDARDS STUDY”) (“data sharing contributes to a virtuous
circle, where promoting effective sharing widens research and enhances scientific
impact”). See also Karim R. Lakhani et al., The Value of Openness in Scientific Problem
Solving,
Harvard
Business
School
Working
Paper
07-050
(http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/07-050.pdf last accessed July 1, 2009) (offering
empirical evidence in support of the proposition that the solution of scientific
problems is facilitated by free and open information sharing).
9 See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ENSURING THE INTEGRITY, ACCESSIBILITY, AND
STEWARDSHIP OF RESEARCH DATA IN THE DIGITAL AGE 55 (2009) (HEREINAFTER NAS –
RESEARCH DATA) (“only when a researcher shares data and results with other
researchers can the accuracy of the data, analyses, and conclusions be verified”) and
Paul David, The Economic Logic of “Open Science” and the Balance between Private
Property Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and Information: A Primer in
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND
INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM (2003) (hereinafter
NRC – Public domain) at 21 (“[d]isclosure … creates an expectation that all claims to
have contributed to the stock of reliable knowledge will be subjected to trials of
verification, without insult to the claimant”).
10 See Dov Greenbaum, Research Fraud: Methods for Dealing with an Issue that
Negatively Impacts Society’s View of Science, 10 COLUMBIA SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 75-77
and Jocelyn Kaiser, Data Integrity Report Sends Journals Back to the Drawing Board,
325 SCIENCE 381 (2009) (citing numerous recent examples of scientific misconduct).
11 For the sake of argument, I will assume that scientific discoveries, by and large, are
socially beneficial. I recognize but avoid the thorny debate over the desirability and
social utility of research in some controversial fields (e.g., human cloning, embryonic
stem cells, biological warfare, genetic modification of organisms, nuclear
fission/fusion, cryogenics, and the like).
Moreover, I intentionally avoid the question of whether maintaining discoveries as
secret, as opposed to sharing them, can lead to greater innovation, particularly in
industrial settings. See Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917,
__ (2011). For purposes of this paper, I abide by the generally-held assumption that
7
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despite the acknowledged importance of sharing scientific information, the
ability of scientists to access information relevant to their fields has come
under increasing pressure.
The most prominent means of disseminating results in the sciences is,
and has been for more than three centuries, publication in peer-reviewed
scientific journals. 12 Prior to World War II, scientific journals were
published primarily by learned societies organized and governed by
members of the scientific community.13 Today, what was once a cottage
industry is dominated by a handful of commercial publishers that control a
market valued at between $7 billion 14 and $10 billion annually. 15 The
ascendancy of commercial publishers in scientific publishing began in the
late 1950s and has had several notable effects.
First, the number of journals catering to specialized sub-disciplines
expanded rapidly. In 1960, it has been estimated that roughly 2,800
scientific journals were in print. 16 Today, estimates place the number
somewhere between 16,00017 and 24,00018 journals.
Second, between 1975 and 1995, publishers significantly increased
subscription rates for scientific journals and began to “bundle” titles into
expensive packages offered to libraries at a single hefty rate.19 Increases
scientific progress is more typically advanced by disclosure, rather than concealment,
of discoveries. And in any case, the discoveries addressed in this paper are ones that
scientists have intentionally submitted for publication, evidencing their own
preference for disclosure over secrecy. Any subsequent limitations on access to these
discoveries by journals are imposed by the policies and financial considerations of
journals rather than scientists.
12 See Robert K. Merton, Behavior Patterns of Scientists (1968) in The Sociology of
Science, supra note 5, 325, 337 (“From its very beginning, the journal of science
introduced the institutional device of quick publication to motivate men of science to
replace the value set upon secrecy with the value placed upon the open disclosure of
the knowledge they had created”); and JOHN M. ZIMAN, PROMETHEUS BOUND: SCIENCE IN A
DYNAMIC STEADY STATE 39 (1994) (arguing that the peer-reviewed publication process
is “at the very core of academic science” and “inseparable from its other functions”).
13 What is generally regarded as the first scientific journal, the Philosophical
Transactions, was launched by the British Royal Society in 1665. Today many
journals, including the prestigious title Science published by the American Association
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), are still published by learned societies.
14 EPS Market Monitor, Nov. 2003.
15
Market
Research.com,
Technology
&
Media
(http://www.marketresearch.com/Technology-Media-c1599/Media-c92/ScientificTechnical-Medical-c1661/) (visited Feb. 11, 2012).
16 Tenopir & King (2000) at para. 7.
17 “Access all areas”, The Economist, Aug. 5, 2004.
18 Manon A. Ress, Open-Access Publishing: From Principles to Practice in ACCESS TO
KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 475, 477 (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy
Kapczynski, eds., New York: Zone Books, 2010) (quoting David W. Lewis).
19 European Commission, Study on the economic and technical evolution of the
scientific publication markets in Europe: Final Report – January 2006, p.23.
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were at levels far in excess of inflation and resulted in subscription rates
significantly above those of non-profit journals.20 As a result, the cost of
subscribing to many journals, particularly those in specialized technical
fields21, became prohibitive to all but the largest institutions. What followed
was a widespread reduction in subscription volume by academic libraries of
all sizes. 22 Even Harvard University, arguably the wealthiest academic
research institution in the world, recently announced that continuing its
subscriptions to the full range of scientific journals at an annual cost of
$3.75 million would be “financially untenable”.23
This period of sustained price increases, which continues today,24 and
the accompanying cancelation of journal subscriptions by academic
libraries has been termed the “serials crisis”. The serials crisis prompted a
widely-voiced concern among libraries, scientists and public interest
advocates that researchers were being deprived of access to the latest
developments in their fields, thereby adversely impacting their own
research and teaching. An unawareness of the latest research findings
makes it more likely that scientists will conduct research that is duplicative
or that does not make us of the latest advances. And access to the latest
scientific literature is important not only for researchers, but also for
professionals who require up-to-date technical knowledge in their fields.
For example, one recent study of healthcare professionals (primarily
See Carl T. Bergstrom & Theodore C. Bergstrom, The Costs and Benefits of Library
Site Licenses to Academic Journals, 101 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 897 (2004). Harvard
University estimates that online journal subscriptions from two major publishers
have escalated by 145% over a six-year period. Harvard University Faculty Advisory
Council, Major Periodical Subscriptions Cannot be Sustained (Memorandum to
Faculty
dated
April
17,
2012)
(available
at
http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k77982&tabgroupid=icb.tabgroup143
448) (hereinafter Harvard FAC Memo). In response, Elsevier reports that its print list
price increases have averaged only five percent per year. Ian Sample, Harvard
University Says it Can’t Afford Journal Publishers’ Prices, The Guardian, Apr. 24, 2012.
21 According to one study, the average subscription cost of commercially-published
journals in the field of economics in 2001 was over $1,600. Theodore C. Bergstrom,
Free Labor for Costly Journals?, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 2001, at 183. Specialist
publications, particularly in the medical literature, can cost in the range of $20,000
per year. Pamela Burdman, A Quiet Revolt Puts Costly Journals on Web, N.Y. Times, Jun.
26, 2004 (citing the annual subscription rates of The Journal of Comparative Neurology
($17,995) and Brain Research ($21,269)). Harvard University has reported that some
journal subscriptions cost as much as $40,000 per year. Harvard FAC Memo, supra
note 20.
22 Though this trend affected institutions and scientists worldwide, its impact was felt
most acutely at institutions in developing countries, some of which were unable to
sustain subscriptions to any relevant scientific publications. See JOHN WILLINSKY, THE
ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR OPEN ACCESS TO RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP 14 (2006).
23 Harvard FAC Memo, supra note 20.
24 See Mark McCabe & Christopher M. Snyder, The Economics of Open-Access Journals
(2010)
at
1
(available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=914525), and Aaronson, et al.,
supra note 6.
20
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physicians and nurses) found that a lack of access to current medical
literature could have an impact on patient care.25 For all of these reasons,
limiting access to scientific research findings is likely to have a negative
impact on social welfare.
In this paper, I propose a reallocation of rights between scientific
authors and publishers in order to address the serials crisis and reduce the
social welfare losses that it has occasioned. In Part I, I review the nature of
the scientific publishing market and the causes of the serials crisis. In Parts
II and III, I analyze existing proposals to address the crisis, including
Steven Shavell’s recent proposal to abolish copyright in academic works
and a number of “open access” publishing models that have gained some
measure of market acceptance. In Part IV, I turn to mandated open access
approaches, including the U.S. NIH’s open access policy, and discuss the
potential pitfalls of relying on governmental programs as long-term
solutions. In Part V, I describe the convergence of a number of existing
open access efforts defined by particular time periods after which scientific
literature is released to the public. Using these “latency” periods as a basis,
in Part VI, I propose that the most effective means of addressing the crisis
in scientific publishing is to effect a shift in publishing norms using a
broadly-adopted license agreement that eliminates the assignment of
copyright to the publisher and allows only a one-year exclusivity period
before the publication must be released to the public. I argue that such a
shift is possible and has precedent in a similar shift that occurred in the
academic legal publishing market through the efforts of academics in the
1990s.

I.

THE MAKING OF A CRISIS

A. The Traditional Model of Scientific Publishing
Merton observes that an individual scientist’s rewards consist in large
part of recognition and esteem, both of which are achieved through the
communication of results to the scientific community.26 What’s more, the
Jamie O’Keeffe, John Willinsky & Lauren Maggio, Public Access and Use of Health
Research: An Exploratory Study of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Public Access
Policy Using Interviews and Surveys of Health Professionals, 13 J. Med. Internet Res. at
4 (2011).
26 Merton, Normative Structure, supra note 5, at 274-75. See also NAS – RESEARCH DATA,
supra note 9, at 55 (“[r]esearchers receive intellectual credit for their work and
recognition from their peers … when they publish their results and share the data on
which those results are based”), Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1751, 1800-01 (2010) (norms of scientific practice “mandate
uncompensated forfeiture of private knowledge in exchange for the prospect of
reputational prestige”), and John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and
25
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quantity and prestige of a researcher’s publications and the number of
citations they receive from others are critical factors in securing scarce
government grant funding. 27 Thus, researchers have significant personal
incentives, both reputational and financial, to publish their findings as
quickly as possible. The result is of personal benefit to researchers, but also
confers benefits on society.28
Nothing of value, of course, comes free, and the route to publication in a
prestigious scientific journal is often difficult, time-consuming and
circuitous. Once a researcher has made a finding deemed worthy of
publication,29 he or she must write an article describing that finding together
with supporting data, illustrations and the like. The author then submits the
article to the most prestigious journal that he or she deems likely to accept
it. The most selective and prestigious journals can publish only a small
fraction of the thousands of articles submitted to them each year, and a
scientist’s prominence and career advancement are dependent, in large part,
on the number of publications that he or she places in highly-regarded
journals. 30 Because most journals prohibit or strongly discourage
simultaneous submissions, and because most journals’ review cycles take
weeks or months, scientists have an incentive to target their papers to the
highest-ranked journal with a realistic possibility of acceptance.31
Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 Emory L.J.
101, 155-56 (2001) (discussing motivations of scientists).
27 One NIH spokesperson has noted that “applicants with robust publication histories,
[and] proven track records of scientific accomplishment . . . may have the edge over
their younger, less experienced counterparts.” Bob Grant, New NIH Forms Raise
Concerns,
THESCIENTIST.COM
(available
at
http://www.thescientist.com/blog/display/56209/).
28 See NAT. RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING PUBLICATION-RELATED DATA AND MATERIALS:
RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORSHIP IN THE LIFE SCIENCES 34 (2003) (hereinafter NRC –
SHARING PUBLICATION-RELATED DATA) (“the act of publishing is a quid pro quo in which
authors receive credit and acknowledgement in exchange for disclosure of their
scientific findings”).
29 Because researchers are often rewarded for the sheer number of publications that
they produce, they sometimes strive to squeeze as many papers as possible from a
single project. This practice has resulted in an increase in the total number of papers
published, each of which consists of what is ironically referred to as a “Least
Publishable Unit” (LPU). See William J. Broad, The Publishing Game: Getting More for
Less, 211 SCIENCE 1137 (1981).
30 The Thomson Reuters Journal Citation Reports (JCR) assign “impact factors” to
scientific journals based on a variety of factors including the number of citations
received by articles published in those journals. See ZIMAN, supra note 12, at 180
(noting that in terms of scientific success, “[o]ne paper with a hundred citations is
worth infinitely more than a hundred papers with one citation each”) and Research
Information Network, To Share or Not to Share: Publication and Quality Assurance of
Research Data Outputs 25 (2008) (available at www.rin.ac.uk/data-publication) (the
assessment of researchers is “perceived to value above all else the publication of
papers in high-impact journals”).
31 This is in contrast to disciplines such as law, in which the cost and effort of
simultaneously submitting a paper to multiple journals (often hundreds at once) is
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When a journal receives a submission, its editorial staff conduct an
initial screening review. Papers that do not meet editorial guidelines, either
due to inappropriate subject matter (e.g., a paper on psychology that is
submitted to an oceanography journal), the significance of their conclusions
(e.g., a minor or incremental finding submitted to a highly-ranked journal),
poor writing, or failure to comply with formatting or other editorial
requirements, are rejected quickly.
If a paper appears to fall broadly within the journal’s guidelines, the
staff editors may then submit it for review by an editorial board consisting
of respected scientists in the field. If the paper appears to be significant
enough to publish, the editorial board will send it to two or more peer
reviewers (also known as “referees”) for evaluation and comment. Peer
reviewers are selected based on their research interests, experience,
prominence in the field, and often their own history of publishing with the
journal. Peer review can be conducted either “blinded” (the reviewers do
not know the identity of the authors) or “unblinded” (the identities of the
authors are known to the reviewers). Reviewers, once selected, are asked
by the journal to evaluate a submission based on its scientific merit,
originality, significance and, if unblinded, the reputation of the authors.
Peer reviewers will seldom advise a journal to publish a paper as originally
submitted. Many papers, in fact, are rejected at this stage. But if a paper is
deemed to be of potentially publishable quality, reviewers will usually
suggest a number of changes, both editorial and substantive, and,
occasionally, will require additional experimentation or analysis. The
reviewers’ comments are returned by the journal to the author, who may
then revise the paper to address the comments and, if necessary, gather
additional data, refine the analysis, and revise the paper. Once revised, the
paper is resubmitted and the process is repeated until the paper is either
accepted or rejected. If the paper is rejected, either initially or after review,
the author must select another journal and revise the paper to comply with
that journal’s formatting, length and editorial requirements. This process is
often repeated multiple times until the paper is finally accepted for
publication by a journal.
Once accepted, the journal’s editorial staff may edit and format the
paper, check references, format figures and images, and otherwise prepare
the accepted paper for publication. One recent study reports that the period
from completion of scientific work until publication is typically between

extremely low and which results in the highest-ranked journals being swamped with
thousands of unsuitable papers for consideration.
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twelve and eighteen months. 32 Other studies have found comparable or
longer delay periods, depending on the field.33
As time-consuming and frustrating as the journal submission and peer
review process may be, journals are generally acknowledged to add value to
the publication process. Among their primary contributions are qualitycontrol and selection, which they achieve both through their own editorial
review and by coordinating the peer review process. Busy working
scientists have limited time to study the literature relevant to their fields and
educate themselves regarding new developments and discoveries. As a
result, scientists rely on journals and journal reputation to organize and
prioritize their intake of information and their limited capacity to read the
current literature. 34 Journals thus act as value-added intermediaries at
several points between authors and readers.35

B.

The (New) Economics of Scientific Publishing

1. Cost. The economic model enjoyed by scientific journals is fairly
simple and enviable. On the cost side, journals obtain the majority of their
content for free. Unlike publishers of general interest periodicals and
newspapers, they employ few, if any, writers, reporters and
photographers.36 And unlike most book publishers, journals pay no author
royalties. Rather, as described above, scientists submit their work to
journals solely in exchange for intangible benefits such as reputational
enhancement, career advancement and improved odds of securing grant
Carlos B. Amat, Editorial and Publication Delay of Papers Submitted to 14 Selected
Food Research Journals. Influence of Online Posting, 74 SCIENTOMETRICS 379 (2008).
33 See William D. Garvey & Belver C. Griffith, Scientific Information Exchange in
Psychology, 146 SCIENCE 1655, 1656 (1964) (reporting that in the psychology field,
their study indicated that the time between hypothesis and publication is between 30
and 36 months, and the time between reportable results and publication is between
18 and 21 months) and Charles G. Roland & Richard A. Kirkpatrick, Time Lapse
Between Hypothesis and Publication in the Medical Sciences, 292 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 1273,
1274 (1975) (finding delays of 20 and 24 months between the completion of research
and publication, respectively, for medical laboratory research and clinical research
studies). Anecdotally, the author has been informed that publication delays are
typically even longer in the social sciences.
34 One study shows that, on average, a scientist will only read between 100 and 200
scientific articles per year from 18-26 different journals, out of more than one million
peer-reviewed scientific articles published annually. Carol Tenopir & Donald W. King,
The Use and Value of Scientific Journals: Past, Present and Future, 14 SERIALS 113, 114,
117 (2001).
35 In economic terms, scientific publishers have been analyzed as intermediaries in a
two-sided market, intermediating between authors on one side and readers on the
other. See McCabe & Snyder, supra note 24.
36 In addition to scientific papers, many journals also publish editorials,
correspondence and short news stories of potential interest to their readership. Some
of this content is provided by paid correspondents or freelance writers.
32
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funding: benefits that are not funded directly by the journals. What’s more,
these same scientists perform a significant quality control and editorial
function for the journals as peer reviewers. Again, they donate their
services without direct compensation to enhance their own relationships
with journals and as inherent duties of their academic positions.
Of course, journals do incur operational costs relating to submissions
management, article screening, selection and coordination of peer
reviewers, copy editing, art production, publication (both in print and
online), marketing and distribution. After publication, journals incur
ongoing costs associated with maintaining and archiving articles online,
making supplementary materials and data available, offering search and
indexing functionality, publishing related correspondence, technical
comments and occasional retractions, 37 and sometimes handling legal
claims that may be made with respect to published articles.38
Estimates of the costs incurred by scientific publishers vary. By one
estimate, publication costs for a single article in the most prestigious
scientific journals can run up to $10,000.39 Others estimate that “first copy”
costs of publishing an article in a scientific journal (i.e., excluding printing,
distribution, marketing and overhead expenses) typically run between
$1,000 and $4,000.40
2. Revenue. The traditional journal revenue model is based on
subscription sales to academic libraries.
Libraries acquire journal
subscriptions to make their content available to researchers within their
institutions. In the past, this meant that paper copies of journals would be
routed to relevant researchers or placed in departmental lounges before
being archived in the library’s general collection. Today, most scientific
journals are distributed electronically (sometimes in addition to print
copies), and an institutional subscription entitles affiliated researchers to
access the journal’s articles in electronic form.

See Letter from Alan I. Leshner, Chief Executive Officer and Executive Publisher,
Science, to Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) dated January 12, 2012 (on
file with author).
38 Such claims may involve allegations of defamation, scientific misconduct, fraud,
plagiarism, copyright infringement and conflict of interest. While ultimate legal
liability for such claims may rest with the authors and/or their institutions, journals
are often the first responders when such claims are made.
39 Jocelyn Kaiser, Free Journals Grow Among Ongoing Debate, 329 Science 896, 897
(2010).
40 Donald W. King, The Cost of Journal Publishing: A Literature Review and
Commentary, 20 LEARNED PUBLISHING 85 (2007) and THE WELLCOME TRUST, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
OF
SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH
PUBLISHING
(2004)
(available
at
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@policy_communication
s/documents/web_document/wtd003182.pdf).
37
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As discussed in the Introduction, the subscription model for scientific
journals worked without major incident until the large-scale entrance of
commercial publishers following World War II. Beginning in the 1960s,
the number of scientific journals began to proliferate, so that over the last
fifty years the number of individual journal titles has increased by
approximately a factor of ten.41 Together with the expanding number of
journals, subscription rates increased dramatically, resulting in widespread
cancelation of subscriptions and, as discussed above, the so-called serials
crisis. 42 According to a 1997 study conducted by Page, Campbell and
Meadows, subscription revenue still accounts for approximately 85% of
total revenue for journals in the sciences.43
In addition to subscription revenue, scientific journals earn income from
reprint sales (encompassing printed “reprints”, permissions for reproduction
and one-time access to electronic copies). According to one estimate, a
single highly-cited article can generate reprint revenue of up to $700,000.44
However, most articles generate little or no reprint revenue. Page,
Campbell and Meadows report that combined “reprint” revenue accounts
for approximately 8% of total revenue for journals in the sciences.45
Another potential revenue source for some journals is advertising. In
2008, for example, the American Medical Association, publisher of the
prestigious Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) reported
that advertising generated 49% of its total publishing revenue. 46 The
percentage, however, is significantly lower for commercial publishers that
have a larger overall revenue base. Page, Campbell and Meadows report
that 5% of journal revenue is attributable to advertising.47
Both revenue and operating margin for scientific publishers are sizeable.
As noted above, the overall annual market for scientific journals is
estimated to be between $7 and $10 billion. 48 The field is dominated,
however, by a few large publishers. In 2009, the two largest, Elsevier and
Wolters Kluwer, earned annual revenues of approximately $3 billion and $1
billion, respectively, and each enjoyed profit margins in excess of 30%.49
See notes 16-18, supra, and accompanying text.
See note 24, supra, and accompanying text.
43 GILLIAN PAGE, ROBERT CAMPBELL & ARTHUR JACK MEADOWS, JOURNAL PUBLISHING 65
(Table 6.5) (reproduced in WELLCOME TRUST, supra note 40.
44 E. Ray Dorsey, Benjamin P. George, Elias J. Dayoub, Bernard M. Ravina, Finances of
the Publishers of the Most Highly Cited US Medical Journals, 99 J. MED. LIBR. ASSN. 255,
257 (2011).
45 PAGE, CAMPBELL & MEADOWS, supra note 43, at 65 (Table 6.5).
46 Dorsey, et al, supra note 44. Note, however, that the AMA, as a non-profit publisher,
charges far lower subscription rates than commercial publishers.
47 PAGE, CAMPBELL & MEADOWS, supra note 43, at 65 (Table 6.5).
48 See notes 14-15, supra, and accompanying text.
49 Dorsey, et al., supra note 44, at 256. In contrast, the top 10 non-profit publishers of
medical journals earned total combined revenues of less than $200 million in 2008.
41
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3. The Journal Pricing Debate. The complaint that elevated
subscription pricing shuts out too many potential consumers may at first
seem inconsistent with basic economic theory. Absent governmental
regulation or violations of antitrust law, producers generally have no
obligation to price their goods so that every potential consumer can afford
them. Assuming that scientific papers are unique works that are not easily
substitutable,50 pricing of scientific journals would be expected to approach
the publisher’s profit-maximizing point. That is, in the market for a product
as to which there are few and/or imperfect substitutes, a producer (acting as
a monopolist51) will increase its price up to the point above which further
increases would result in diminished demand and lower overall profit. At
this point some quantity of consumers will purchase the product, but fewer
than the number that would purchase it at a perfectly competitive price. If
the producer sets the price of its products too high, it will forego profits.
One could argue, therefor, that journal publishers have no incentive to overcharge for subscriptions, as this tactic would inure to their own detriment.
Critics contend, however, that just because a small number of wealthy
institutions can afford journals’ high subscription rates, the market is not
working efficiently. Instead they see a market failure that reduces overall
social welfare,52 namely the advancement of scientific progress. Scientific
literature, they argue, is not a luxury good, the overall distribution and
production of which society is indifferent to. Rather, the broad distribution
of scientific knowledge is itself a social good that should be encouraged, or
at least not stymied through the pricing action of non-producing
intermediaries such as publishers. The loss of utility experienced by
consumers who do not purchase a product at the monopolistic publisher’s
profit-maximizing price is termed deadweight loss.

Id. The Economist reports Elsevier’s 2010 profit margin at 36%. Of Goats and
Headaches, THE ECONOMIST, May 26, 2011.
50 Felix S. Chew, Kevin T. Llewellyn & Kathryn M. Olsen, Electronic Publishing in
Radiology: Economics and the Future, 1 J. AM. COLL. RADIOLOGY 815 (2004) (supporting
the notion of non-substitutability of journals in radiology).
51 The scientific publishing market may more accurately be described as one of
monopolistic competition, in which products (journals) do not serve as substitutes for
one another, but in which producers (publishers) do exhibit some characteristics of
market competitors. The publishing industry is generally viewed as exhibiting the
characteristics of monopolistic competition. See, generally, N. GREGORY MANKIW,
PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 329-31 (6th ed. 2012).
52 Landes and Posner argue that total welfare should not be affected by losses to
consumers from higher prices in markets dominated by copyright. WILLIAM M. LANDES
& RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 81-82
(2003). This view, however, assumes a regime in which the creation of copyrighted
works is affected by the level of copyright protection. In the case of scientific
publishing, incentives for authors are typically independent of copyright protection.
See Section x, infra.
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This critique echoes the criticism of pharmaceutical manufacturers in
the “access to medicines” debate. These manufacturers are alleged to have
charged monopolistic profit-maximizing prices for patented drugs in
developing countries, where only a tiny fraction of the population can
afford them. In this market, deadweight loss can be equated to a reduction
in access to life-saving medications, and a corresponding social benefit can
be derived from minimizing this deadweight loss.53
In the case of scientific publishing, deadweight loss is created when
institutions are unable or unwilling to pay a journal’s subscription rates and
are thus unable to give their faculty access to the journal’s content. In other
words, the deadweight loss represented by the inability of scientists to
access scientific information results in less overall scientific advancement fewer medical and technological breakthroughs - and is thus socially
undesirable.54 The reported effects of the serials crisis on actual institutions,
both within the industrialized world and, more tellingly, in the developing
world, support the argument that overall scientific progress may be less than
it otherwise could be absent the publishing industry’s current pricing
structure.55
Journals, of course, incur costs, and many critics acknowledge that
scientific publishers contribute value to the publishing enterprise. Landes
and Posner remind us of this often-neglected element of the equation:
We must not ignore the publishers ... Given substantial
fixed costs of publication and easy copiability, publishers
may need copyright protection in order to be able to
See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Comment: Compulsory Licensing of Patented
Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J. L. Med. & Ethics 247, 250
(2009), and Sean Flynn, Aidan Hollis, & Mike Palmedo, An Economic Justification for
Open Access to Essential Medicine Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. Med. & Ethics
184, 185 (2009).
54 Suboptimal social welfare may result not only from loss of access by institutions
unable to afford publishers’ profit-maximizing rates, but also from those that can
afford these rates, as the excess rent paid by research institutions to publishers
(whether funded internally or by government grants) is diverted to publishers and
away from the funding of further scientific research. And unlike other monopolists,
such as patent-holding pharmaceutical manufacturers, who arguably utilize excess
profits to fund further research and development, scientific publishers do not
themselves fund any scientific research.
55 See, e.g., JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR OPEN ACCESS TO RESEARCH
AND SCHOLARSHIP at ix, 93-94 (2006) (describing the devastating loss of subscriptions
by research institutions in the developing world), and Barbara Aronson, Improving
online access to medical information for low-income countries, 350 NEW ENGLAND J.
MED., 9668 (2004) (reporting the results of a 2001 WHO study finding that 56% of all
research institutions in the lowest-income tier countries had no subscriptions to
international scientific journals and 21% averaged only two such subscriptions; and
even in the next income tier, 34% had no subscriptions, and 34% had between two
and five such subscriptions).
53
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recover their fixed costs even if they don’t have to pay a
cent for the expressive content of what they publish56
Critics counter, however, that the escalating subscription rates charged by
journals have far outstripped mere cost recovery and cannot be justified on
this basis alone. The reported 30%+ profit margins of major commercial
publishers, substantially in excess of margins elsewhere in the publishing
industry, 57 would seem to support this assertion. Moreover, unlike
pharmaceutical manufacturers, scientific journals do not require even a
portion the financial incentives permitted by monopolistic pricing in order to
fund the creation of new scientific works, as these works are created by
scientists who are not financially compensated by the journals.

C. Leveraging Copyright
Given that both the bulk of the content that they publish and a
significant editorial and quality-control function are provided to journals for
free by their own customers, how have commercial publishers managed to
escalate the prices of scientific journals to monopolistic levels that, by most
accounts, are far in excess of their costs? Reputational factors and the
dependence of scientists on publication in prestigious journals give journals
significant leverage to attract high-quality articles notwithstanding their
pricing policies. 58 But once a journal attracts an article, it retains its
absolute control over the article through copyright law.
1. Why Copyright Matters. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the
power to secure to authors the exclusive right to their writings for limited
times in order to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts”.59
Thus, according to the well-known incentive-based copyright argument,
authors must be granted some exclusivity in their works if they are to be
persuaded to create them in the first place. 60 As Thomas Macaulay
explained in 1841, copyright imposes “a tax on readers for the purpose of
giving a bounty to writers”.61
Landes & Posner, supra note 52, at 53.
See Ernst & Young, New Study Shows Profitability and Growth in Media and
Entertainment
(Mar.
14,
2011)
(available
at
http://www.ey.com/US/en/Newsroom/News-releases/New-study-showsprofitability-and-growth-in-media-and-entertainment)
(finding
average 20%
profitability in publishing industry).
58 Journals’ relative impunity in this area is bolstered by the separation of research
and library functions at most institutions.
59 U.S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8.
60 Landes & Posner, supra note 52, at x. But see, Stan J. Leibowitz, Is Efficient Copyright
a Reasonable Goal?, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1692 (2011) (arguing that economic
efficiency is not a reasonable goal of copyright law).
61 Thomas B. Macaulay, The First Speech on Copyright, February 5, 1841, in MACAULAY’S
SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT AND LINCOLN’S ADDRESS AT COOPER UNION 18, 25 (Charles Robert
56
57
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As an initial matter, however, it is not immediately apparent why
copyright law matters at all in scientific publishing. The law is well-settled
that scientific facts, data and discoveries are not themselves copyrightable.62
And, unlike most other works of authorship (e.g., novels, musical
compositions, paintings and screenplays), there is little creative expression
in the text of scientific journal articles, and only marginally more in their
illustrations and figures. The primary, if not the only, goal of such articles
is to communicate new scientific data, findings and conclusions to an
interested audience of fellow scientists. The manner of expression, the
language in which the article is written, provided that it is generally
comprehensible to the intended audience, is irrelevant.63
For example, below are two short descriptions of the same scientific
finding. One is an excerpt from the abstract of an actual scientific article,
the other is a rewording of that excerpt in a form that conveys the same
information (to the best of this author’s limited ability), but via a different
form of expression:
Although eye color is usually modeled as a simple,
Mendelian trait, further research and observation has
indicated that eye color does not follow the classical paths
of inheritance ... Although there are about 16 different
genes responsible for eye color, it is mostly attributed to
two adjacent genes on chromosome 15.64
Despite the typical modeling of eye color heritability in
classical Mendelian terms, our research shows that eye
color is not determined through traditional inheritance
pathways… We identify a pair of neighboring genes along
chromosome 15 that are found to have primary
responsibility for determining eye color, among the sixteen
or so genes that are generally credited with affecting this
trait.
Gaston ed., 1914) (quoted in Stephen G. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A
Look Back Across Four Decades, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1635, 1641 (2011).
62 See INS v AP, Feist v. Rural Telephone. See generally J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A
Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly
Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 315, 33738 (2003) (describing the ‘thin’ copyright in scientific works and data).
63 In fact, the prose in which scientific articles are written has frequently been
criticized for its density, turgidity and generally poor quality. See, e.g., Rachel Toor,
Bad Writing and Bad Thinking, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Apr. 15, 2010 (criticizing scholarly
writing that uses “multisyllabic words, complex phrasing, and sentences that go on for
days” and noting that “[i]f you're too clear, if your sentences are too simple, your
peers won't take you seriously”).
64 Désirée White & Montserrat Rabago-Smith, Genotype–phenotype associations and
human eye color, 56 J. HUMAN GENETICS 5 (Jan. 2011).
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Though these two statements arguably convey the same scientific
information (two genes out of sixteen strongly influence inherited eye
color), the two modes in which this idea is expressed are sufficiently
distinct that the second version should not infringe the copyright in the
first.65 Thus, even if dissemination of the first statement were barred by the
owner of the copyright (a journal), that copyright owner could not restrict
dissemination of the second statement.
If this is the case, then what would prevent scientific authors from
recreating each of their copyrighted articles in a different guise and
allowing the “second” versions to be distributed free of the control of
publishers? Legally speaking, this approach might be viable. Practically
speaking, however, such rephrasing would require a significant amount of
work by the author – work that would not result in any material benefit.
There is a low likelihood that busy scientists, racing to obtain grant funding
and publish their latest findings, would take the time to rewrite each of their
articles simply to help others who could not afford to subscribe to certain
journals. And what about rewriting by graduate students, laboratory
technicians or even undergraduate work-study students? While no formal
study has been conducted, scientists whom I have informally queried claim
that they would be unlikely to read or give much credence to such rewritten
articles. They would be concerned about reliability and the introduction of
errors, about losing the nuances of an experienced researcher’s reasoning,
and about the interpretive exigencies of any translation exercise. Thus, even
for scientific works, it appears that copyright cannot easily be
circumvented, and that any solution to the serials crisis must address
copyright head-on.
2. Author’s Assignment of Rights. Under modern copyright law, the
author of a “literary” work has a number of exclusive rights, including the
rights to reproduce, distribute and display the work. 66 The authors of
scientific journal articles, which generally qualify as literary works, are also
entitled to these exclusive rights.67 But when a scientific article is accepted
The test for determining copyright infringement in the U.S. is whether one work is
“substantially similar” to another. Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.
66 17 U.S.C. §106.
67 Under the Copyright Act, ownership of a copyrightable work vests in the author
upon fixation of the work in a tangible medium. 17 U.S.C. §102(a). But in the case of
employees who create copyrighted works within the scope of their employment
(works made for hire), their employers are treated as the authors and thereby obtain
ownership of the copyright. 17 U.S.C. §101. An exception to this rule has been
recognized in the case of academic authors, most of whom are employed by a
university or other institution, but who typically retain copyright in works either
through contractual arrangement with their institution or via the so-called “teacher
exception” to the work made for hire doctrine. See Eric Priest, Copyright, Scholarship,
Authorial Autonomy, and the “Harvard” Open Access Mandate, __ Nw. J. L. Sci. Tech. __
(forthcoming 2012).
65
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for publication in a journal, the publisher typically requires that the author
assign to it the full copyright in the article. This assignment of copyright
gives the publisher complete and exclusive control over the reproduction,
dissemination and publication of the work, even as to the original author
and his or her institution.68 And while some limited rights to use the work
for educational and research purposes may be available under the “fair use”
doctrine69, these rights cannot be exercised unless the user has access to a
copy of the work. Thus, one of a publisher’s key assets is the ability to
prevent those who have not paid for a work from accessing it.70
3. Copyright Duration. As observed by Patricia Aufderheide and Peter
Jaszi, copyright is both “long and strong”. 71 Despite the Constitutional
restriction of the term of an author’s copyright exclusivity to “limited
times”, the term of copyright protection in the U.S. has grown steadily over
the years. Under the original Copyright Act of 1790, Congress set the
maximum period of exclusivity at twenty-eight years (an initial term of
fourteen years plus a fourteen-year renewal term). Since then, the term of
copyright in the United States has steadily increased.72 Today, under the
1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, the copyright term for
most works is the life of the author plus seventy years. 73 The term of
protection can thus easily exceed a century. Because of this extraordinary
protective period, the exclusive rights controlled by publishers enable them
to control the market for scientific works for the entire useful life of those
works.
Interestingly, had the current copyright regime then been in effect, the
works of Nicola Tesla (1856-1943) and George Washington Carver (18641943), each of whom made significant scientific discoveries during the
nineteenth century, and most scientists who followed them, would still be
protected by copyright in 2012. What if only a handful of scientists at
In economic terms, copyright enables the journal publisher to act as a monopolist in
the market for readers. See Frank Mueller-Langer & Richard Watt, Optimal Pricing
and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Forced Open
Access: A Two-Sided Model at 17 (TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2012-19, Apr. 25, 2012).
69 17 U.S.C. §107.
70 Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-304,
prohibits any attempt to circumvent electronic protection measures to access a
digitally protected work, even if the purpose is to exercise fair use rights. For a
critique of this level of legal protection in the context of scientific data, see generally
Reichman & Uhlir, supra, note 62, at 376-79.
71 PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE – HOW TO PUT BALANCE BACK IN
COPYRIGHT 16 (2011).
72 The extension of copyright term is not unique to the U.S. See Council Directive
93/98/EEC of 29 October 2003 (implementing the same copyright term length later
reflected in the Sonny Bono Act in the U.S.).
73 17 U.S.C. 302(c). For anonymous works, pseudonymous works and works made for
hire, the copyright term expires 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation,
whichever occurs first. Id.
68
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wealthy institutions had access to the corpus of scientific literature of the
last century? One can only speculate (with some dismay) about the effect
that such a lengthy restrictive regime might have had on the “progress of
science”.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
affirmed the ability of Congress to extend the term of copyright protection
at these levels. Most notably, when the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono
Act was challenged in Eldred v. Ashcroft,74 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
majority, relied on “[t]ext, history, and precedent” to confirm that the
Copyright Clause grants Congress broad power to establish the term of
copyright protection,75 and declined to “alter the delicate balance Congress
has labored to achieve”.76 Even more recently, in Golan v. Holder,77 Justice
Ginsburg again affirmed the power of Congress to expand the scope of
copyright protection without significant restraint.
Thus, the long horizon of copyright protection, coupled with the
assignment of copyright by authors to publishers, has resulted in a situation
in which publishers who neither create nor fund the creation of scientific
works exert near-absolute control over their distribution, and charge the
market accordingly. The result has been a curtailment of the literature
available to many members of the scientific community, an undesirable
result from a social welfare standpoint.
It is my goal in this paper to propose a modified scientific publishing
model that both compensates publishers fairly for the value that they add as
intermediaries, while at the same time ensuring that the published scientific
literature is made broadly available to the scientific community to enable
the continuing advancement of science.

II.

ADDRESSING THE CRISIS THROUGH COPYRIGHT
REFORM
A. Abolishing Academic Copyright?

If copyright law caused the serials crisis, then it stands to reason that
substantive changes to copyright law can alleviate it. Steven Shavell,
perhaps the most prominent scholar to advocate this approach, argues that

537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Id. at ___. But see id. at ___ (J. Breyer, dissenting) (arguing that Congress’s expansion
of copyright term should be subject to a “rationality” test).
76 Id. at [n. 10 and slip op. 22] (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. at 230).
77 556 U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012).
74
75
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copyright in academic works should be abolished altogether. 78 While this
conclusion may, at first blush, sound extravagant, Shavell’s careful
reasoning bears consideration.79
First, Shavell suggests that “the conventional rationale for copyright of
written works – that it stimulates their creation and publication by allowing
authors to profit from their sale – is seemingly of limited applicability to
academic authors.” 80 To this end, he observes that academics possess
strong incentives to publish scholarly work that are wholly independent of
copyright. As discussed above, these incentives include recognition, career
advancement and support of grant applications. By the same token,
academics receive little if any direct pecuniary gain from the publication of
scholarly articles.81 Thus, the financial incentives that copyright protection
may offer to the authors of works of fiction, musical compositions and other
copyrighted works do not necessarily apply to works of academic
scholarship, and the abolition of copyright on academic works would likely
have little impact on the overall production of these works or the financial
returns to their authors.
Next, Shavell considers the potential impact of abolishing academic
copyright on publishers. He acknowledges that publishers incur costs
associated with their services as intermediaries. He also postulates that
absent copyright, there would be no effective means for them to prevent
others from copying and distributing published works soon after their initial
appearance. In the face of rapid, inexpensive and legal copying, it would
Steven Shavell, Should Copyright of Academic Works be Abolished? __ J. Leg. Anal. __
(2010). Shavell is not, of course, the first scholar to argue for the abolition or severe
curtailment of copyright term. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970), MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY 15 (2008) (“[t]he basic conclusion of this book is that intellectual monopoly
– patents, copyrights, and restrictive licensing agreements – are unnecessary”),
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 250-52 (arguing for a renewable 5-year
copyright term, with a particular focus on online content). For a contrary view, see
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 52, at 215 (presenting the economic argument for
copyrights of indefinite duration, subject to ongoing renewal requirements).
79 In this brief summary I cannot do justice to the economic model developed by
Shavell, and will primarily address his qualitative reasoning and conclusions. An
alternative to the Shavell model is presented in Mueller-Lander & Watt, supra note 68
(concluding that removal of copyright could have different effects depending on
market configuration).
80 Shavell, supra note 78, at __. For a statement of the traditional incentive-based
argument for copyright, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 52, AT 13 (“the dynamic
benefit of a property right is the incentive that possession of such a right imparts to
invest in the creation or improvement of a resource … It enables people to reap where
they have sown.”)
81 Shavell’s proposal deals both with academic journal articles and books. Given the
focus of my analysis on the serials crisis and means that have been proposed to
alleviate its effects, I do not address his analysis of scholarly books in detail.
78

SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING - CONTRERAS

22

become impossible for journals to charge readers for their content (i.e.,
driving subscription and reprint rates to marginal cost, effectively zero).
Publishers would thus need to look elsewhere to recoup their costs. 82
Absent subscription revenues, publishers would most likely turn to authors.
In such an “author-pays” model, the author’s institution (either itself or
through grant funding) might or might not cover publication costs. If an
author’s institution did not cover publication costs, then the abolition of
copyright might have a negative impact on the production of scholarly work
(as authors would probably be reluctant to pay journal fees out of their
personal funds). However, Shavell argues that institutions and funders
would have numerous reasons to cover these costs (e.g., to ensure that the
work conducted by researchers they support continues to be published), and
would likely have the means to do so.83 In such a world, authors would not
be financially disadvantaged by the abolition of copyright, resulting in no
net increase or decrease in the number of scholarly works produced;
publishers would recover their costs and thus continue to perform as valueadded intermediaries; and the free availability of such works to the public
would yield a significant social benefit. Thus, Shavell concludes that the
abolition of copyright in academic works should be seriously considered as
a possible solution to the serials crisis.

B. The Challenge of Tailoring Copyright Term
Shavell’s proposal to abolish copyright on academic works would adjust
the intellectual property rights awarded by Congress to authors based on the
peculiar incentive structures of the scientific publishing industry. Michael
Carroll refers to this type of industry-specific calibration as tailoring,84 and
observes that tailoring can reduce inefficiencies created by “one-size-fitsall” intellectual property regimes. That is, under the current copyright
system, once a work is determined to be copyrightable subject matter, the
term of protection is uniform, no matter what the nature of the work or its
author. This blunt approach over-compensates creators in industries in
which the incentives to produce new works do not require the level of
protection afforded by the law. This over-compensation comes at the
expense of the public, which has limited rights to exploit the work during
the term of protection, resulting in a net social cost without an offsetting
gain in the production of new works. This cost, which results from the
application of a uniform exclusive term to all forms of copyrighted works,
In a world without copyright, Shavell envisions most publication occurring
electronically, without printing and distribution costs. He thus focuses exclusively on
publisher “first copy” costs.
83 In this vein, he argues that universities would be more than capable of funding such
author fees from the savings they realize by no longer having to pay subscription fees
for academic journals.
84 See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework For Tailoring
Intellectual Property Rights, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 1361 (2009).
82
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has been termed “uniformity cost”.85 According to Carroll, “uniformity cost
is the central problem that intellectual property law must manage.” 86
Robert Merges has framed the problem of uniformity cost in terms of
proportionality, reasoning
that a property right ought to be reasonably related to
something socially useful and valuable.
Where the
unregulated market price of a property right moves
radically out of alignment with underlying social utility, an
institutional response is called for.87
Proposals to tailor the scope and term of intellectual property rights
based on the characteristics and requirements of particular industries have
long been attractive to scholars and advocates. As long ago as 1884,
Congressional backers of the newspaper industry sought (unsuccessfully) to
enact an eight-hour copyright on the news.88 More recently, Dan Burk and
Mark Lemley have pointed to significant differences in the cost and
incentive structures of the pharmaceutical industry, on one hand, and the
information technology industry, on the other hand. 89 These differences,
they argue, cannot be accounted for under the uniform 20-year patent term
afforded under U.S. law, giving rise to significant market inefficiencies and
net social cost.90
In general, applying a uniform set of intellectual property rules to
different industries and technologies is inefficient, and tailoring of these
rights presents a way to reduce this inefficiency. 91 However, as Carroll
points out, “tailoring intellectual property rights well is not easily done”.92
In order to aid policy makers in assessing the feasibility of increasing social
welfare through tailoring of intellectual property rights, Carroll offers a
See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual
Property Law, 15 Am. U. L.Rev. 845 (2006).
86 Id. at 849.
87 ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 181 (2011).
88 News Copyright Bill of 1884. This legislative attempt was defeated. Thirty-two
years later, in INS v. AP, the Supreme Court held that news facts are not subject to
copyright protection, though the expression of the news in written stories might be,
concurrently creating the so-called “hot news” doctrine based on state law tort of
misappropriation.
89 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT (2009).
90 Specifically, Burk and Lemley argue that while a 20-year patent term might be
appropriate to incentivize innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, with its lengthy,
capital-intensive product development cycles and multi-year regulatory approval
process, it is almost certainly not appropriate in the software industry, in which
development cycles are a few months and involve few capital expenditures. Id. at x.
91 See Carroll, Uniformity Cost, supra note 85, at 848 (“perfectly tailored rights that
promise innovators only the expected value required to induce socially desirable
innovation would be theoretically optimal”).
92 Carroll, One Size, supra note 84, at 1366.
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useful analytical framework.93 In this framework, he posits three conditions
that must be satisfied if efficiency gains are to be achieved by tailoring: (1)
there must be reliable evidence that uniformity costs exist and that they can
be reduced by tailoring (I term this the likely “effectiveness” of the tailoring
proposal), (2) the measures proposed to eliminate these uniformity costs
must be administratively feasible, and (3) the tailoring proposal must be
politically feasible.
Shavell’s tailoring proposal would abolish copyright in academic works
through an amendment to the Copyright Act. It is worth assessing this
proposal in terms of Carroll’s three-part framework.94
1. Effectiveness. Shavell’s arguments regarding the mismatch between
copyright protection and incentives to create works of academic scholarship
are consistent with a large body of previous criticism of the academic
publishing market. Thus, I will assume arguendo that uniformity costs exist
in this market and that the tailoring of intellectual property rights can lead to
greater efficiencies and social welfare.
It is less clear, however, that Shavell’s specific proposal to abolish
copyright on academic works would achieve optimal results. If copyright in
academic works were abolished then, as discussed above, commercial
publishers would likely turn to authors to cover their costs. The economics
of an author-pays world are not well understood. Today, a number of open
access scientific journals have adopted author-pays models,95 but these are
still a small fraction of the overall market. If the entire scientific publishing
industry moved from a subscriber-pays to an author-pays model, there is a
risk that the current reader-side serials crisis would simply be transformed
into an author-side serials crisis. That is, once all publishers are operating
under an author-pays model, what would prevent the subsequent escalation
of author fees on a scale mirroring the escalation of subscriber fees today?
In other words, if competition has not mediated price escalation on the
subscriber side (due to the general inelasticity of journal prices) and
publishers have been able to extract super-competitive rents from
subscribers, it is possible that the same market forces would allow a similar
escalation of author fees, particularly among the most prestigious and
desirable (from an author’s standpoint) publications.

Id. at 1406-07.
Shavell’s economic model and assumptions have also been critiqued. See, e.g.
Mueller-Langer & Watt, supra note 68, and Hossein Nabilou, A Response to Prof.
Shavell’s ‘Should Copyright of Academic Works Be Abolished?’, 7 REV. ECON. RES. ON
COPYRIGHT ISSUES 31 (2010). An analysis of the Shavell formal model and its critiques
is beyond the scope of this article.
95 See Section III.B.2, infra.
93
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Moreover, it is not clear that authors or their institutions would be
willing or able to pay author-side fees once they are required by all journals
(as opposed to the small percentage of journals levying such fees today). If
not, then authors (as opposed to readers) could become priced out of the
academic scholarship market or some number of journals could fail.96 In
either scenario, the dissemination of scholarly work could decrease, leading
to a decrease in available scientific knowledge that could rival the decrease
caused by the serials crisis on the reader side. Thus, until further empirical
and modeling work is done to assess the potential market effects of such a
radical economic shift, it would be difficult to conclude that the abolition of
copyright in academic works would be effective in increasing social
welfare.
2. Administrability.
Carroll’s second test queries whether “the
distinctions drawn [by a tailoring solution] are jurisprudentially stable and
administratively cost-effective.”97 An example of a rule that is relatively
easy to administer is Section 105 of the Copyright Act, which denies
copyright protection to works created by U.S. government employees. 98 To
apply this exclusion one must simply determine whether or not the author of
a particular work is an “officer or employee of the U.S. Government” and
whether the work was prepared within the scope of that person’s
governmental duties.99 To the extent that questions have been raised around
its edges (e.g., whether government contractors should be considered
government employees), they can be answered definitively by the courts.
The distinction proposed by Shavell between academic and nonacademic works, however, is less clearly delineated. His proposal would
exclude from copyright “academic works”, encompassing both books and
articles in all academic disciplines. 100 Yet many authors of articles in
scientific journals are not full-time faculty at academic institutions, but
Cf. Mary Waltham, The Future of Scholarly Journals Publishing Among Social Science
and
Humanities
Associations
19
(2009)
(available
at
http://www.nhalliance.org/bm~doc/hssreport.pdf) (noting that of ten social
sciences and humanities journals studied, most could not move to an author-pays
model with their current cost structures).
97 Carroll, One Size, supra note 84, at 1424. See also John Golden, Principles for Patent
Remedies, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 505, 563 (2010) (defining “administrability” as establishing
a regime “that government actors can readily apply and that interested private actors
can readily heed, use, and understand”).
98 17 U.S.C. §§101 and 105.
99 17 U.S.C. §§101
100 Though it is a less critical point, it is also worth noting that all “academic”
literature, including presumably, literature in the humanities, arts, natural sciences,
social sciences, and professional training, has not been substantially affected by the
serials crisis. In this sense, the scope of Shavell’s approach is somewhat over-broad.
For example, literary magazines and many specialized journals in the humanities in
which academic authors publish are priced quite modestly and are not generally
thought to suffer from the inflationary tendencies of scientific journals.
96
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employees of corporations, government agencies, 101 and not-for-profit
institutions such as hospitals, think tanks, advocacy groups and the like.
This is especially true in fields such as pharmaceutical development,
engineering, computer science and economics. It is not clear how Shavell
would deal with scientific articles published by non-academic authors, not
to mention part-time academic authors such as adjunct professors,
instructors, lecturers and postdoctoral fellows, or full-time members of the
academic community who are not normally considered to be academic
faculty: graduate students, project managers and technicians. Is Shavell’s
proposal to abolish copyright dependent on the employer of the author, the
nature of the author’s engagement with an academic institution, or the type
of work being published? If the former, then significant inconsistencies
would arise in the many scientific journals that carry articles by both
academics and non-academics (i.e., some articles would be copyrighted,
others not). If the latter, it is not clear that the arguments regarding the
rationale for abolishing copyright for academics apply equally persuasively
to non-academic authors. Moreover, it is difficult to conceptualize a
justifiable subject matter-based exclusion from copyright that would
accomplish the goal of alleviating the serials crisis without being stated so
broadly that it would also eliminate copyright on textbooks, technical
manuals, industry standards and other technical works that may be more
deserving of copyright protection. Thus, it is not clear that Shavell’s
proposal offers a solid basis for differentiating between protected and
unprotected content that “the law can adequately delineate”, 102 and thus
suffers from likely difficulties in administrability.
3.
Political Economy. The third prong of Carroll’s tailoring
framework requires an assessment of the political economy of a tailoring
proposal. As any alteration to the scope of copyright protection is likely to
require an amendment to the Copyright Act, Shavell proposes
Congressional action to address the uniformity cost of academic publishing.
The Copyright Act has, of course, been amended many times, and many of
these amendments have been made with the purpose of “tailoring”
protection for one specific industry or another.103 Such legislative initiatives
include protections for the cable and satellite television industries (Sections
111 and 119), the digital music industry (Section 114) and visual artists
(Section 106A).
However, unlike most previous amendments to the Copyright Act,
Shavell’s proposal would act to reduce the term of copyright protection
No copyright attaches to the work product of U.S. federal employees, but the same
is not true for state and local government employees or employees of foreign
governments.
102 Carroll, One Size, supra note 84, at 1425.
103 The Patent Act has been subject to similar industry-specific tailoring initiatives.
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 89, at 95-96.
101
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rather than increase it. He reasons that “[e]liminating academic copyright
seems feasible from a political perspective because of its likely
endorsement by universities, academics and students.”104 While it is indeed
conceivable that a coalition of universities, academics and students might
support the abolition of academic copyright (except, possibly, in the case of
university press publications), the effectiveness of such coalitions has been
limited in cases involving copyright term length. For example, in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, the petitioners (Eldred, et al.) were joined by amici curiae
including fifteen library associations, five arts-based academic associations,
seventeen economists, five constitutional law professors, fifty-three
intellectual property law professors, and numerous other groups. This
broad-based coalition was unsuccessful in persuading the Court and,
evidently, in influencing Congress with respect to the enactment of the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act the year before (which passed
in the House by a comfortable margin of 297-112).105
While Shavell acknowledges that political opposition to his proposal
would likely be raised by commercial publishers, he only mentions in
passing potential opposition from other parties that “would view the
abolition of academic copyright as undesirable because it might lead to
erosion of intellectual property rights in a wider domain.” Based on the
enactment within the last decade and a half of the strongly pro-copyright
Sonny Bono Act, Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), it would appear that the procopyright lobby in the United States is both formidable and effective. 106
Thus, there is some doubt regarding the likelihood that Congress could be
persuaded to abolish copyright in academic works in the current political
environment.107
There are additional political impediments to the legislative
amendment that Shavell proposes. He only mentions in passing that the
abolition of academic copyright could conflict with U.S. treaty
obligations. 108 The so-called TRIPS Agreement 109 establishes minimum
requirements for intellectual property protection among WTO member
Shavell, supra note 78, at 54.
Congressional Record, Vol. 144, 1998, H1482-H1483.
106 The recent popular opposition to the pending copyright bills SOPA and PIPA was
fueled primarily by the technology sector, an increasingly powerful foil to the procopyright content industries. Unfortunately, it is hard to envision technology vendors
expending significant political capital supporting the abolition of academic copyright.
107 This is not to say, however, that no legislative action in the area of scientific
publishing is possible. See discussion, infra, of the NIH OA Policy and related
legislation.
108 Shavell, supra note 78, at __, n. 88.
109 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat.
4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (hereinafter “TRIPS Agreement”).
104
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states. With respect to copyright, the TRIPS Agreement requires members
to abide by Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (1971), another treaty to which the United
States is a party. Article 1(1) of the Berne Convention expressly includes
within the scope of copyright “every production in the literary, scientific
and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression,
such as books, pamphlets and other writings, lectures, addresses, sermons
and other works of the same nature.” While certain exceptions from the
scope of protection are permitted under the TRIPS Agreement, these may
only be imposed in “special cases”. 110 And Article 12 of the TRIPS
Agreement requires that the minimum copyright term for protected works
be the life of the author plus fifty years. Thus, it is likely that one could
raise a serious challenge to the abolition of copyright for academic works
on the basis of the United States’ obligations under both the TRIPS
Agreement and the Berne Convention.111
Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, in June 2003 Representative Martin
Sabo (D-Minn) introduced a bill to the House that would have had an effect
similar to Shavell’s proposal, though only with respect to federally-funded
research. Representative Sabo’s Public Access to Science Act (H.R. 2613)
would have amended Section 105 of the Copyright Act to provide that
“Copyright protection … is not available for any work produced pursuant to
scientific research substantially funded by the Federal Government.”112 The
bill, which had three co-sponsors, was referred to the House Judiciary
Committee but failed to exit committee.113
Lemley and Burk, recognizing the difficulty of enacting effective
legislative changes, suggest that tailoring of intellectual property rights
(specifically patents) may best be achieved through judicial action. 114
While Carroll is “less pessimistic” about the potential for legislative
tailoring solutions, he too acknowledges that achieving lasting efficiency
gains through legislative enactments is challenging. 115 In the case of
abolishing copyright for academic works, the legislative hurdles seem
particularly high.

TRIPS Agreement, Art. 13.
Burk and Lemley acknowledge this potential barrier to legislative tailoring in the
context of patents. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 89, at 97.
112 Public Access to Science Act, H.R.2613, §3(b)(1) (Jun. 26, 2003)
113 While the Public Access to Science Bill was ultimately unsuccessful, it was
succeeded in 2004 by the Congressional directive responsible for the NIH OA Policy
discussed in Section IV below. That legislation, unlike the Public Access to Science
Bill, did not abolish copyright in federally-funded scientific works, but encouraged
(and later required) their release on an open access basis following the expiration of
an exclusivity period negotiated by publishers. See discussion at Section IV.A, infra.
114 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 89, at 104-06.
115 Carroll, One Size, supra note 84, at 1432.
110
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Based on the foregoing, under all three prongs of Carroll’s framework
for analyzing the tailoring of intellectual property rights, Shavell’s proposal
to abolish copyright in academic works appears to face significant practical,
administrative and political challenges.

III.

RESPONSES IN THE SHADOW OF COPYRIGHT: THE
OPEN ACCESS MOVEMENT

Whatever the theoretical merits of abolishing academic copyright may
be, no such proposals have yet gained serious traction among lawmakers or
other major stakeholder groups. In contrast, the “open access” (OA)
movement among academic scholars and librarians has had a significant
and growing impact on the public availability of scientific literature.
A.

The Rise of Open Access

The emergence of the open access movement in scientific publishing
is often linked to the rise of the Internet in the early- to mid-1990s, when it
became increasingly clear that research publications could be shared online
with minimal cost and great speed. In 2000, Harold Varmus, the Nobel
Prize-winning Director of the U.S. National Cancer Institute, and other
prominent scientists formed the Public Library of Science (PLoS), a
coalition dedicated to improving public access to biomedical literature.
They circulated an open letter, which was eventually signed by 34,000
scientists in 180 countries, urging publishers to make “the full contents of
the published record of research and scholarly discourse in medicine and the
life sciences” available to the public within six months after initial
publication.116 The OA movement continued to gain momentum in 2001,
when a group sponsored by George Soros’s Open Society Institute met in
Budapest to develop a set of recommendations for expanding open access to
peer-reviewed scientific literature. The resulting Budapest Initiative
(released in February 2002) calls both for self-archiving of journal articles
by academic scholars and a “new generation” of open access journals that
would be disseminated as widely as possible.117 Similar statements followed
from Bethesda, Maryland (June 2003)118 and Berlin (Oct. 2003)119. These
The
text
of
the
PLoS
2001
letter
can
be
found
at:
http://www.plos.org/about/what-is-plos/early-history/
117
The statement of the Budapest Initiative can be found at:
http://www.soros.org/openaccess/read.
118 The Bethesda Statement on Open Access Publishing offers “concrete steps” that
scientists, publishers, libraries and funding agencies can take to “promote the rapid
and
efficient
transition
to
open
access
publishing”.
http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/bethesda.htm
119 The Berlin Declaration on Open access to Knowledge in the Sciences and
Humanities offers several conditions and definitions further elaborating the path
toward establishment of an open access regime in scientific publishing.
http://oa.mpg.de/berlin-prozess/berliner-erklarung/
116
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three declarations (Budapest, Bethesda and Berlin, now commonly referred
to as the “Three Bs”), received widespread support from the international
scientific and academic communities. Though they differ in various
respects, all three call for the free, online accessibility of scientific literature
and the elimination of restrictions on its reproduction.
These calls for open access have given rise to a number of distinct
OA approaches over the past decade. Below is a brief summary of the
principal modes of open access publication for scientific literature.
B.

Modes of Open Access Publication

1.
Self-Archiving – The Green Route. Many academic
researchers post copies of their work on departmental or institutional web
pages, making them available to all without charge. This practice has been
termed self-archiving or the “Green” route to open access. One recent study
found that in 2008, approximately 12% of the published scientific literature
was available through Green open access archives. 120 While this figure
demonstrates that impressive gains have been made over the past decade,
self-archived literature is still a relatively small percentage of the overall
body of scientific literature.
Though self-archiving enjoys the twin virtues of convenience and
speed, it is not without its limitations. Most notably, it depends heavily on
the technical capabilities and idiosyncrasies of the author’s home
institution, lacks indexing across different institutional repositories, and
becomes unstable when authors move from one institution to another. To
address these issues, some disciplines have moved toward centralized
archiving services such as arXiv.org (physics and mathematics) and SSRN
(social sciences, economics and law). These services generally allow free
submission of articles, some limited indexing, and free access to all users.
They are typically supported by volunteer efforts, institutional grants and/or
charitable contributions. In addition, numerous software tools now exist to
enable self-archiving and meta-tagging of documents so that they can be
easily searched and indexed.121
From a copyright standpoint, before an author enters into a
publishing contract with a journal, he or she is free to self-archive drafts and
working papers as he or she wishes. But once an article is accepted by a
journal and the author assigns the copyright to the publisher, the publisher
obtains the exclusive right to control distribution of that work. Thus, the
author who wishes to post a copy of a published article on his or her
institutional web site cannot do so without the permission of the publisher.
Bo-Christer Björk, et al., “Open Access to the Scientific Journal Literature: Situation
2009”, PLoS ONE 5(6) (June 2010).
121 Willinsky, The Access Principle, supra note 55, at App. F.
120
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In response to this situation, a number of prominent research
universities, in conjunction with groups such as the Association of College
and Research Libraries (ACRL) and the Scholarly Publishing and Academic
Resources Coalition (SPARC), began in 2005 to encourage researchers to
utilize so-called “author addenda” in their publishing contracts.122 Among
other things, author addenda reserve the author’s right to self-archive prepublication versions of articles following journal publication. 123 Large
institutions that subscribe to numerous research publications have proven to
possess sufficient bargaining leverage to persuade publishers to permit such
archiving by their faculty, often after the expiration of an “embargo” period
of 6-12 months, and self-archiving of pre-print versions of articles after the
expiration of an agreed embargo period is now permitted by a growing
number of commercial publishers. 124 But, as several commentators have
pointed out, a pre-print version of an article cannot substitute for the final
published article, as it cannot be cited or quoted authoritatively, nor would
it always reflect the refinements and corrections introduced by a journal’s
peer reviewers.125
Green OA offers a convenient and inexpensive way to disseminate
research literature to a large audience. However, it is unlikely that selfarchiving can ever replace the selection, editing and reputational functions
provided by third party journals.
2.
Open Access Journals – The Gold Route. Self-archiving is,
among other things, designed to mitigate the copyright-based access
limitations imposed by proprietary journals. An alternative OA approach
seeks to bypass limited-access journals altogether and make published
literature open from the outset.126 This approach is enabled by a relatively
See SPARC, Author Rights: Using the SPARC Author Addendum to Secure Your Rights
as
the
Author
of
a
Journal
Article
(available
at
http://www.arl.org/sparc/author/addendum.shtml).
123 Archived pre-publication versions of articles are typically either “pre-print”
(articles that have not yet been accepted by a journal) or “post-print” (the final
manuscript after peer review and acceptance for publication, but prior to the
publisher’s copy editing, design, formatting and other services).
124 The RoMEO database hosted by University of Nottingham currently lists 217
publishers that automatically allow institutional self-archiving of articles and 58 more
that allow self-archiving after the expiration of an embargo period.
http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/PDFandIR.php?la=en (accessed December 4, 2011).
125 See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 78, at 43, and Michael Jubb, Correspondence - Open
Access: Let’s Go for Gold, 487 Nature 302 (2012). The same observation applies to
conference presentations, posters and abstracts. While valuable scientific information
is undoubtedly disseminated through these channels, often long before results appear
in a published article, only the definitive, published article is typically cited in another
scientific article or grant application.
126 In the strictest sense of “open access”, journals should permit free online access to
content without any restrictions on reuse (provided that users cite the original author
122
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new category of OA journals that support themselves not by charging
subscription or access fees to readers, but by charging the authors who
publish in them. This model has become known as the author-pays or
“Gold” route to open access. 127 The first significant Gold OA publishing
venue was launched by for-profit publisher BioMed Central in 2000. Today,
BioMed Central is part of the Springer publishing group and publishes more
than 220 OA journals in all fields of biomedical science. In 2003, the
Public Library of Science (PLoS) launched its first open access journal,
PLoS Biology, with financial backing from the Gordon and Betty Moore
Foundation. Since then, PLoS has achieved significant recognition and its
flagship journal, PLoS ONE, published 6,749 papers in 2010, more than any
other scientific journal.128
Author publication fees for Gold OA journals generally range from
$1,000 to $5,000 per article, but can reach $10,000 or more in some
cases.129 While the researcher’s institution is generally responsible for the
payment of these fees, an increasing number of funding agencies and
foundations have indicated a willingness to pay author publication fees for

and publisher on copies and derivatives of the content). Michael Carroll has recently
noted that “some publications have begun offering an open-access option that charges
for Internet publication without granting readers full reuse rights”. Michael W.
Carroll, Why Full Open Access Matters, 9 PLoS Biology, Nov. 29, 2011, at 1. Carroll
argues that this “pseudo open access” approach violates both the spirit and the
purpose of open access publication and fails to produce the benefits that “full” open
access can provide.
127 Some advocates of Gold OA argue that only a minority of open access journals
charge author fees. See, e.g., Peter Suber, Open Access Overview (available at
http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/overview.htm) (visited August 18, 2012)
(reporting that 70% of Gold OA journals charge no author-side fees). Presumably,
many of the non-charging Gold OA journals either receive funding from institutional
or governmental sources or rely exclusively on volunteer efforts. Such approaches
are not likely both to produce high-quality work and remain viable over the long
term. Thus, for purposes of this article, I follow the custom of equating Gold OA
approaches with the author-pays model. See McCabe & Snyder, supra note 24.
By the same token, many professional societies (such as the American
Physiological Society) charge authors publication fees in order to defray member
subscription costs. See Dale J. Benos, L. Gabriel Navar & Margaret Reich, Publishing in
the Journals of the APS: Why are authors charged fees?, 278 AM. J. PHYSIOLOGY
GASTROINTESTNAL LIVER PHYSIOLOGY 663, 663 (2000) (“Like many other association
publishers, APS is able to keep subscription prices low by sharing some of the cost of
publishing the journals with the authors who submit manuscripts... Many commercial
publishers do not charge authors for publication (i.e., page charges) but have much
higher subscription prices”), see also, Proceedings Natl. Acad. of Sci., Information for
Authors, available at http://www.pnas.org/site/misc/iforc.shtml (detailing fees per
page and per color figure), and J. Virology, Instructions to Authors, available at
http://jvi.asm.org/misc/journal-ita_pub.dtl (detailing fees per page and per color
figure).
128 John Whitfield, Open access comes of age, 474 Nature 428 (2011).
129 Maria Leptin, Open Access – Pass the Buck, 335 Science 1279 (2012).
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research that they fund. 130 In addition, such fees are often waived or
heavily discounted for researchers in developing countries.131
The growth of Gold OA journals over the past decade has been
steady and is showing signs of achieving financial sustainability. One study
found that in 2009 nearly 200,000 peer-reviewed articles were published in
4,769 Gold OA journals, representing between 6% and 8% of the total peerreviewed scientific literature published that year.132 Thus, while Gold OA
journals have seen impressive gains in just a decade, the large majority of
peer-reviewed scientific output continues to be published in commercial,
limited-access journals; and some critics question whether Gold OA
journals will ever achieve a significant market share. 133 Among the
challenges such journals face are their current lack of prestige as compared
to many traditional journals, which dissuades scientists from submitting
their best work to them.134 Moreover, until such time as a large segment of
the market consists of author-pays journals, 135 Gold OA journals will
compete for authors and content with traditional journals that charge
authors nothing. Thus, in the marketplace for new articles, Gold OA
journals will continue to suffer a competitive disadvantage to traditional
reader-pays journals. This situation will continue to be the case even if
funders permit grant funding to be used to defray author-side publication
fees, as some level of effort will always be required on the author’s part to
secure this funding, and in an era of declining grant funding, a few thousand
dollars per article in publication fees can always find other productive

Declan Butler, US Seeks to Make Science Free for All, 464 Nature 822, 823 (2010). A
group of major research universities including Harvard, M.I.T., Dartmouth, Cornell,
Berkeley, Columbia, Memorial Sloan-Kettering and the University of Ottawa have
formed a group called the Compact for Open-Access Publishing Equity to advocate for
greater payment of open access publication fees by research funders. Compact for
Open-Access Publishing Equity (available at http://www.oacompact.org/compact/).
131 See, generally, Jorge L. Contreras, Open Access Scientific Publishing and the
Developing World, 8 ST ANTONY’S INTL. REV. 43, 53-55 (2012) (discussing “information
philanthropy” in the developing world).
130

Mikael Laaski, et al., The Development of Open Access Journal Publishing from 1993
to 2009, 6 PLoS ONE (June 2011). Significantly higher figures for OA journals are
reflected in the online Directory of Open Access Journals (www.doaj.org), which, as of
this writing, lists more than 7,300 OA journals in 117 countries. However, these
figures rely on self-reporting, do not account for discontinued or merged journals, and
do not required that journals be peer reviewed in order to be included. Shavell places
the percentage of Gold OA journals in 2009 at 4%. Shavell, supra note 78, at 44-45.
133 Shavell, supra note 78, at 46-47.
134 Shavell views this lack of prestige as the most serious challenge faced by OA
journals, though he also expects that the quality gap between traditional and OA
journals may diminish over time. Shavell, supra note 78 at 46-47.
135 This is the situation that Shavell would bring about with the abolition of academic
copyright.
132
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uses.136 Finally, it is still unclear whether an author-pays Gold OA model is
financially viable across a large field of competitors. Many of the major
Gold OA initiatives operating today have received substantial supplemental
funding from charitable sources 137 or are part of larger profit-making
organizations (e.g., BioMed Central, the OA arm of Springer). Such nonrecurring revenue and support, while helpful to the initial entrants to the
Gold OA marketplace, may not be available to subsequent entrants, raising
questions regarding the “scalability” of the model.138
3.
Voluntary Time-Delayed Open Access. Scientific publishers
have not uniformly opposed open access initiatives, and a few have even
embraced them. Learned societies still publish a number of important
scientific journals, and these have been among the most receptive to OA
publishing models due, in large part, to advocacy by their members.
Examples include the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) (published
by the Massachusetts Medical Society) and Molecular Biology of the Cell
(MBC) (published by the American Society for Cell Biology). Each of
these journals now voluntarily makes its contents publicly-available after a
waiting period (six months in the case of NEJM, two months in the case of
MBC).139 All seventeen journals published by the American Physiological
Society make their contents openly available after twelve months. 140 The
theory behind such delayed-release programs is that dues-paying members
of the society benefit from immediate access to journal content, and are not
harmed by the eventual public availability of such content.
Though promising, such delayed-release programs are limited
primarily to journals published by learned societies rather than commercial
publishers. Societies, in contrast to commercial publishers, serve their
members through multiple channels, of which journal publication is only
one. As of 2006, however, the three largest commercial publishers of
scientific journals collectively controlled sixty percent of scientific research
Moreover, it is often the case that only a project’s principal investigator has access
to grant funding for publication fees, and not post-doctoral fellows or graduate
students and publication often occurs months or years after the expiration of the
grant funding. (I am grateful to Monte Buschbaum for these insights).
137 For example, in 2004 PLoS reported that 90% of its revenue derived from
contributions and grants. By 2009, 89% of its revenue were earned from author fees.
Dorsey, et al., supra note 44, at 257.
138 One recent analysis conducted by the UK government found that depending on
starting assumptions about author fee levels and international uptake of Gold OA
journals, a transition of UK research publications to a fully Gold-OA model could cost
the UK higher education sector anything from zero to £70 million per year. Editorial Openness Costs, 486 Nature 439 (2012) (citing Report of the Working Group on
Expanding Access to Published Research Findings, Accessibility, Sustainability,
Excellence: How to Expand Access to Research Publications (June 2012) (the Fitch
Report)).
139 Willinsky, The Access Principle, supra note 55, at 68.
140 John Willinsky, The Publisher’s Pushback against NIH’s Public Access and Scholarly
Publishing Sustainability, 7 PLoS Biology 20, 21 (2009).
136
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content, and have significant subscription and reprint revenues at stake.141
These organizations have not, by and large, engaged in large-scale adoption
of open access models, and some commentators do not see such a shift as
likely 142 (the notable exception being Springer’s acquisition in 2008 of
BioMed Central, the largest Gold OA publisher).
4.
Institutional Open Access Mandates. Both Green and Gold
routes to open access are largely voluntary. That is, authors choose to make
their work openly accessible, either by self-archiving or submitting it to an
OA journal. As demonstrated by the relatively modest proportion of
articles available through self-archiving sites, scientists have little incentive
to incur the cost and effort to self-archive.143 Beginning in 2008, however,
several prominent research universities including Harvard, the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and University College London,
began to implement policies arising from their frustration with commercial
publishers’ unwillingness to allow self-archiving of their faculty authors’
published articles. 144 These policies typically mandate that faculty deposit
all research publications into open access databases after the passage of
some defined time period following publication. 145 Such mandates give
researchers a strong incentive to submit their work to journals that permit
self-archiving or other open access release, and by the same token
encourage commercial journals to permit this form of open access. By the
end of 2011, more than 150 institutions worldwide had implemented such
mandatory open access policies for scholarly publications.146 In many cases,
the use of time delays before published content is granted open access status
has served to facilitate negotiation and agreement regarding this difficult
issue.147
Id. at 18.
See, McCabe & Snyder, supra note 24, at 3-4.
143 This effort would include, in addition to whatever work were required to post the
article online, an often-frustrating exchange with the publisher securing permission
to self-archive.
144 For an extensive analysis of Harvard’s open access mandate, and a discussion of
the distinction between “deposit mandates” (in which university faculty are simply
required to deposit their published work into OA repositories) and “permission
mandates” (in which the university purports to reserve to itself the right to publish all
works produced by its faculty) see Eric Priest, supra note 67 (questioning the legal
enforceability of university permission mandates under copyright law). See also, John
Timmer, MIT to Make All Faculty Publications Open Access, ARS TECHNICA, Mar. 24,
2009, and Open-access publishing gains another convert, 459 Nature 627 (2009).
145 Many of these mandates, however, also permit authors to “opt out” of the open
access requirement on a case-by-case basis. See Priest, supra note 144, at x.
146 ROARMAP Registry of Open Access Repositories Mandatory Archiving Policies
(available at http://roarmap.eprints.org/)
147 See Jorge L. Contreras, Data Sharing, Latency Variables and Science Commons, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1601 (2010) (discussing negotiation of timing periods in this and
other multi-stakeholder contexts).
141
142
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However, such initiatives have generally been limited to large and
influential research institutions whose faculty may be less vulnerable to
retaliation (or the fear of retaliation) by journals. Smaller institutions might
be reluctant to jeopardize the publication options of their faculty by
imposing such mandates.
Moreover, the results of such bilateral
negotiations are usually protected by confidentiality clauses, making the
benchmarking of such agreements difficult for those wishing to negotiate
with publishers.

IV.
A.

FROM MOVEMENT TO MANDATE
Funder and Agency Open Access Mandates

The preceding section describes a number of privately-ordered open
access initiatives developed by research institutions, scientists and
publishers to counteract the effects of the serials crisis in scientific
publishing. During the period that these initiatives were being implemented,
many of the leaders of the open access movement were also urging major
research funders, both governmental and charitable, to take similar steps
toward encouraging the broad public availability of scientific literature.148
This call was soon answered by major private research foundations
including the Wellcome Trust in the UK, and the Howard Hughes Medical
Institute and the MacArthur Foundation in the U.S. Each of these
organizations now requires that all researchers to whom it provides
financial support must deposit any resulting journal articles into an open
access repository. Like the institutional mandates described in Section
III.B.4 above, these policies encourage researchers to submit their papers to
journals that permit some form of open access release, and also encourage
commercial publishers to permit self-archiving of these articles within some
time period following initial publication.
Beginning in 2003, scientists, archivists and policy makers also
began to approach U.S. and European governmental funding agencies
regarding the need for open access to scientific publications. In the case of
government agencies, open access advocates had available to them an
additional argument not germane to the private sector: that it is
inappropriate for research funded by the taxpayers to inure solely to the
financial benefit of publishers. Their strong contention was that taxpayerIn fact, many of these leaders themselves held government office. The primary
example of this close connection between the OA movement and government is
Harold Varmus, co-founder of PLoS, who has served as Director of both the National
Institutes of Health and the National Cancer Institute (the position in which he
currently serves).
148
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funded research should be made freely-available, both to scientists and to
the general public.149 The implications of this argument are significant, as
government-funded scientific research represents a large portion of all
academic research conducted globally. According to one estimate, research
funded by the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) alone, which has an
annual research funding budget of more than $30 billion, results in
approximately 60,000 new scientific papers every year.150
Both NIH and Congress were highly receptive to this argument.
Accordingly, in June 2004, the House Appropriations Committee directed
NIH to adopt a policy making all scientific publications generated by NIHfunded research available online. Shortly thereafter NIH engaged in an
informal rulemaking procedure and public comment solicitation. During
the 60-day comment period, the agency received more than 1,000
responses, including significant opposition from publishers and
representatives of other content-based industries. After considering this
public response, NIH adopted a policy 151 that encouraged, but did not
require, researchers to place the full text of their published articles into the
National Library of Medicine’s publicly-accessible PubMed Central
archive152 within six months following publication in a journal.
But with little direct incentive to do so, and the prospect of having to
negotiate nettlesome publication addenda with publishers who were
unfamiliar with (or hostile to) the NIH policy, scientists did not submit their
articles to PubMed Central in large quantities. 153 Advocates again
approached Congress regarding the need for access to taxpayer-funded
research. Accordingly, in 2007 Congress directed NIH to revise its policy
to require open access publication of NIH-funded publications.
The revised NIH policy154 (the “NIH OA Policy”) went into effect in
2008. It provides that all publications resulting from NIH-funded research
The patient advocacy community has forcefully argued that access to the latest
research contained in medical journals is of critical importance to patients and their
families and caregivers.
150 Willinsky, The Access Principle, supra note 55, at 2.
151 Policy on Enhancing Public Access to Archived Publications Resulting from NIHFunded Research, NOTOD05-022, Feb. 3, 2005 (available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/noticefiles/NOT-OD-05-022.html).
152 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
153 According to a 2006 NIH progress report, the compliance rate with NIH’s voluntary
policy was 3.8%. Peter Suber, “NIH report to Congress”, Open Access News, Feb. 16,
2006 (available at http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/2006/02/nih-report-tocongress.html).
154 National Institutes of Health, Revised Policy on Enhancing Public Access to
Archived Publications Resulting from NIH-Funded Research, NOT-OD-08-033 (Apr. 7,
2008), implementing Division G, Title II, Section 218 of PL 110-161 (Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008).
149
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must be uploaded to PubMed Central within one year of publication.155 The
NIH OA Policy has already had a significant impact on the availability of
biomedical literature: as of the end of 2011 the PubMed Central repository
held approximately 2.3 million published articles relating to the biomedical
sciences.
The NIH OA Policy has likely been successful because it balances
the interests of publishers, scientists and the public. Thus, even though
published articles are made publicly-available one year after initial
publication, enough institutions are willing to pay for immediate access that
journals can continue to charge subscription fees and recoup their costs plus
some profit during the one-year exclusivity period. The continued high
profit margins of the leading scientific publishers suggests that NIH’s
policy has not significantly reduced subscriptions to commercial journals,156
nor have any discernible number of commercial journals gone out of
business as a result of their inability to charge for access to articles after
they have been placed in PubMed Central.
Similar open access mandates have been enacted by the European
Research Council, the UK Medical Research Council and numerous other
non-U.S. funding agencies. The NIH OA Policy has also been viewed with
approval by other agencies within the U.S. federal government, and in 2010
and 2012 bills were introduced in the House of Representatives that would
have required all other federal research funding agencies to adopt a similar
policy. 157 Thus far, these initiatives have not gained significant political
momentum.158

B.

Vulnerabilities of Agency Mandates

Despite the apparent success and promise of agency mandates, there
are at least three significant issues that may limit their effectiveness as longterm solutions to the scientific publishing crisis.
Note the lengthening of the “latency” period from six months under the 2005
policy to twelve months under the 2008 mandatory policy, largely due to the agency’s
attempt to respond to public comments received from the publishing industry.
156 See Dorsey et al., supra note 44, at Fig. 2.
157 Federal Research Public Access Act (FRPAA), H.R. 5037, 111th Cong. (2010) and
Federal Research Public Access Act (FRPAA), H.R. 4004, 112th Cong. (2012).
Companion legislation was introduced in the Senate by Senators Cornyn, Wyden and
Hutchison. Federal Research Public Access Act of 2012, S.2096, 1125 th Cong. (2012).
158 The political will to act in this area may be supplied by another grassroots effort –
a petition launched on the White House’s open government web site in May 2012
which had received nearly 30,000 signatures by August. See Petition: Require Free
Access Over the Internet to Scientific Journal Articles Arising from Taxpayer-Funded
Research (available at https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/require-freeaccess-over-internet-scientific-journal-articles-arising-taxpayer-fundedresearch/wDX82FLQ) (visited August 18, 2012).
155
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1.
National Open Access? The principal argument made in
support of agency open access mandates is that taxpayer-funded research
should not redound solely to the financial benefit of private commercial
publishers, but rather should be made available to the taxpayers who funded
it. Doing otherwise requires the taxpayer to pay twice for the same goods:
the first time through his taxes, and the second time through the
subscription fees charged by publishers. As described by Rep. Mike Doyle
when introducing legislation this year to expand the scope of the NIH OA
Policy, “Americans have the right to see the results of research funded with
taxpayer dollars.”159
This argument is attractive for its rhetorical simplicity and its appeal
to a populist sentiment that is currently in vogue. 160 It has also been
relatively successful in marshaling support for the NIH OA Policy.
However, the taxpayer argument introduces into the open access debate a
national character that has not previously been present.
The national character of research funding is one of the seldomdiscussed puzzles of the open access model. Proponents of open access to
Mike Doyle, Rep. Doyle Introduces Bill to Ensure Public Access to Federally-Funded
Research (Feb. 9, 2012) (available at http://doyle.house.gov/press-releases1/2012/02/doyle-introduces-bill-to-ensure-public-access-to-federally-fundedresearch.shtml) (visited 4 Mar 2012).
160 The argument suffers from some obvious logical flaws that have largely been
ignored. For example, U.S. taxpayers also “pay for” nuclear weapons, Air Force One,
federal courthouses, penitentiaries and containers of grain shipped to developing
countries, yet there is no serious argument that the average taxpayer should be
permitted to access or use these assets simply on the basis of tax funding. In essence,
the payment of taxes does not (and cannot, practically speaking) give rise to any
direct entitlement to the things that the government spends those tax dollars to
purchase.
159

In terms of intellectual property, the situation is more complex. Works of authorship
created by federal employees are excluded from federal copyright protection. 17
U.S.C. §105. This exclusion tends to support the argument that federal taxpayer
dollars (i.e., those paying the salaries of federal employees) should result in work that
is broadly accessible to the public. Yet the federal copyright exclusion only applies to
federal employees, and not to federal contractors. Copyright in works produced by
authors under federal contract are generally owned by the contractor, with a limited
right to governmental use. And a contrary approach has been taken in federal policy
relating to patents. Under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, the federal government
expressly authorizes government-funded researchers (principally university
laboratories) to secure patent protection for inventions made using federal funding.
And even more puzzling is the fact that the federal government itself obtains patent
protection on inventions made by federal agency employees. Clearly, in the case of
patents, federal policy does not mandate the divestment of rights based on the receipt
federal funding. Thus, it is by no means clear that the presence of federal funding
should compel the release of scientific publications contrary to the protections
afforded by copyright law.
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federally-funded scientific literature generally advocate global open access.
That is, literature that is considered “open access” should be available to
any reader throughout the world without charge. This model reflects the
global, open nature of the Internet (national censorship notwithstanding),
and has generally been adopted by open access publications and resources
across the board, including PubMed Central. There are many valid
arguments, both ideological and instrumentalist, for adopting such a global
approach. But the argument that U.S. taxpayer-funded research should be
accessible to the taxpayers does not support a global open access approach.
Rather, this argument would tend to favor a system whereby research
publications were made accessible only to U.S. taxpayers (institutional or
individual), but not to foreign ones. Such a nationally-based open access
system (which I have termed “National OA”) would, in economic terms,
better allocate the benefit of U.S. tax dollars to U.S. taxpayers, and would
eliminate economic free riding by non-U.S. consumers of research. 161
Thus, supporters of broad open access initiatives should be wary of the
taxpayer argument and its potential to limit the scope of information
availability in the future.
2.
Limited Copyright Permissions. From a legal standpoint, it
is important to note that agency mandates such as the NIH OA Policy do
not purport to divest publishers of any exclusive rights under copyright
law.162 Rather, these policies require agency-funded researchers to upload
their published articles to a centralized open access repository, but in
compliance with copyright law. For example, under the NIH OA Policy,
authors are required to deposit their published articles into the federallymanaged PubMed Central repository within one year following publication.
Because the publisher acquires the copyright in the article, the author
cannot make this deposit without the publisher’s permission. Publishers, of
course, would be short-sighted in prohibiting PubMed Central deposits,
because much high-quality research in the U.S. is funded by NIH. It is thus
in their interest to enable authors to comply with the NIH OA Policy.
Publishers could enable this compliance by granting authors a
copyright license to upload their articles to PubMed Central upon expiration
of the one-year holding period. However, most publishers have elected to
take a more circuitous route and grant the author no copyright license.
I address the potential for a National OA model in greater detail in Jorge L.
Contreras, Letter to Ted Wackler, Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of Science and
Technology Policy, Re: OSTP Request for Information: Public Access to Peer-Reviewed
Scholarly Publications Resulting from Federally Funded Research (76 Fed. Reg. No.
214 at 68,518), January 12, 2012.
162 Some have argued that a mandate in this form could constitute the “taking” of a
property right under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and thereby
impose on NIH an obligation to compensate the publisher for the fair value of the
appropriated property. A full analysis of this argument is beyond the scope of this
paper.
161
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Rather, the publishers commit that they will submit the post-print version of
the article to PubMed Central twelve months after publication. 163 This
approach has several advantages for the publisher: it ensures that only the
post-print version, and not the published version, of the article will be
released to the public, and it keeps the publisher’s copyright intact, without
licenses flowing to individual authors. Thus, if the NIH OA Policy were
suddenly to change or be rescinded, publishers could rescind any rights
granted to NIH and no residual rights would remain with the authors. For
the same reason, the commitments made by publishers to authors in this
regard are highly tailored to the specific open access policies being
addressed, and some publishers maintain a separate policy for each different
funding agency that requires open access release.164 Thus, if a particular
funding agency changed or rescinded its open access policy, any new action
required by the publisher would not affect its commitments made with
respect to other agencies.
This level of specificity, while enabling compliance with current
agency policies, is not very adaptable to changed circumstances,
requirements or technologies. Thus, a publisher’s commitment to upload an
article to PubMed Central is useful while PubMed Central is in operation in
its current form. However, what would happen if PubMed Central began to
charge non-U.S. institutions for access (as it might if a National OA
program were implemented)? What if the federal government, in a
politically-motivated flurry of governmental “shrinkage”, transferred
PubMed Central to a private sector entity (much as it has done with the U.S.
Postal Service)? What if Google became the primary vehicle for scientific
publishing? In very few of these cases would publishers’ current OA
commitments compel the re-posting of articles to such new, altered or
improved repositories, and the 2.3 million articles currently residing in
PubMed Central would be stuck there unless some actor could persuade or
pay the publishing industry to authorize this new open access release.
There are thus serious issues with the long-term viability of governmental
and other funder OA mandates.
3.
Political Uncertainty. While OA mandates imposed by a
non-profit funder may remain in place so long as the funder does not
radically change its mission, mandates implemented by governmental
See, e.g., Elsevier, Elsevier NIH Policy Statement (available at
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/authorsview.authors/nihauthorrequest)
(accessed 24 January 2012) and Genetics in Medicine, Authorship Responsibility,
Financial
Disclosure
and
Copyright
Transfer
at
3
(available
at
http://edmgr.ovid.com/gim/accounts/copyrightTransfer.pdf)
164 See, e.g., Elsevier, Elsevier Funding Body Agreements & Policies (available at
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/authorsview.authors/fundingbodyagreements)
(visited 24 Jan. 2012) (providing links to Elsevier’s separate policies for NIH, the
Wellcome Trust, Howard Hughes Medical Institute, the UK Medical Research Council
and 10 other funding bodies).
163
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agencies are subject to the whim of political change. The most successful
agency mandate to-date, the NIH OA Policy, which can already be credited
with the public release of more than 2.3 million scientific journal articles, is
under continual legal attack by the commercial publishing industry.
Legislation seeking to overturn the NIH OA Policy has been introduced in
the House of Representatives twice: in 2008165 and 2011.166 Though neither
of these legislative initiatives gained much ground, it is not difficult to
envision a political climate that would favor the elimination of costly
federal document repositories that essentially duplicate and supersede the
work of private sector enterprises. 167 And even if legislative efforts are
unsuccessful in revoking such policies, changes in agency leadership could
have equally damaging effects on the viability of governmental repositories
and the continuation of agency open access mandates.

V.

COMMONS AND LATENCY IN SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING
A. Science Commons

The term “commons” has long been used to denote a resource
shared by a group of individuals, typically without significant restriction on
its use or consumption.168 In recent years, much has been written about socalled “information commons”, a term used to encompass resources as
varied as computer software, network capacity, artistic content and
scientific data.169 And Peter Suber has aptly applied commons terminology

Fair Copyright in Research Works Act, H.R. 801, 111 th Cong. (2009) (would have
prohibited federal agencies from adopting open access publication policies).
166 Research Works Act (H.R. 3699) introduced in the House by Representatives Issa
and Maloney on December 16, 2011. The bill’s co-sponsors withdrew it in February
2012. See Legislation to Bar Public-Access Requirement on Federal Research is Dead,
CHRON. HIGHER ED., Feb. 27, 2012.
167 From a U.S. political standpoint, it is probably fortunate that the largest scientific
publishers are European (Reed Elsevier – Dutch (approximately 1,800 titles), Taylor
and Francis – UK (more than 1,000 titles) and Springer– Germany (more than 500
titles)), without a significant employment base in the U.S.
168 See Elinor Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge
Commons, in UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 4-5
(Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, eds., 2006) (hereinafter, Knowledge as a Commons).
169 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, Ch. 6 (2001) (arguing that commons
systems have encouraged innovation, specifically with respect to software,
telecommunications and the Internet), Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and
the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (arguing that “commons-based peer
production” of software has proven to be both viable and efficient, as demonstrated
by the model of the Linux operating system), James Boyle, The Second Enclosure
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 44-49
(2003) (discussing open source software), HAL ABELSON, KEN LEDEEN & HARRY LEWIS,
BLOWN TO BITS – YOUR LIFE, LIBERTY, AND HAPPINESS AFTER THE DIGITAL EXPLOSION 277
(2008) (discussing the application of commons theory to broadcast spectrum) and
165
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and theory to the corpus of scientific literature and, in particular, that
portion of the literature that is available on an open access basis.170
In previous work, I have analyzed the effect of various rule sets on
the rate at which new information is added to this scientific literature
commons. 171 A principal finding of this work was the observation of
embargo, exclusivity or restricted periods (which I collectively refer to as
“latency” periods) that emerged, seemingly independently, in each of these
settings. During such latency periods, a publisher typically retains the
exclusive right to offer access to a published work and to charge a premium
for subscription access to it. But after the expiration of the latency period,
the work becomes available for free and open access (either by the
publisher, the author, or a third party). The policy settings and stakeholder
groups involved in these negotiations are summarized in Table 1 below,
along with the resulting “latency” period established.

JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 78-79 (2008)
(discussing commons approaches both to Internet content and hardware).
170 Peter Suber, Creating an Intellectual Commons through Open Access, in Knowledge
as a Commons, supra note 168, at 171.
171
Jorge L. Contreras, supra note 147, and Jorge L. Contreras, Prepublication Data
Release, Latency, and Genome Commons, 329 SCIENCE 393 (2010).
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Table 1
Latency-Based Negotiated Compromises in Scientific Publishing
Setting

Stakeholders

Open Access
Channel

Latency
Period

Institutional
Mandates

Universities, Scientists and
Commercial Publishers

Institutional
self-archiving

6–12 months

Voluntary TimeDelayed OA

Association Publishers and
Scientists (Members)

Publisher

2-12 months

NIH Voluntary
OA Policy
(2005)

Funder, Scientists and
Commercial Publishers

PubMed
Central

6 months

NIH Mandatory
OA Policy
(2008)

Funder, Scientists and
Commercial Publishers

PubMed
Central

12 months

Howard Hughes
Medical Institute
(HHMI)
Wellcome
Trust OA policy

Funder, Scientists and
Commercial Publishers

PubMed
Central

6 months

Funder, Scientists and
Commercial Publishers

UK PubMed
Central

6 months

Proposed Federal
Research Public
Access Act
(2010)

U.S. Federal Agencies, Scientists
and Commercial Publishers

n/a

6 months

UK Government, Scientists and
Commercial Publishers

Journal OA
site or selfarchiving

Immediate (for
journal site) or
12 months
(selfarchiving)

(not enacted)
Research
Councils UK172

To recapitulate: (1) in bilateral negotiations, universities and
publishers have negotiated limited exclusivity periods of six to twelve
months before university researchers are authorized to release published
articles to the public, (2) membership organizations that publish scientific
journals, in response to member demands, voluntarily permit open access
release of articles following an exclusivity period of up to twelve months,
(3) through agency notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, NIH has
mandated that all publications arising from NIH-funded research be
released to the PubMed Central database twelve months after publication,
(4) major charitable foundations such as the Wellcome Trust and HHMI
have mandated that all publications arising from research funded by them
Research Councils UK Policy on Access to Research Outputs (Jul. 17, 2012)
(available at
http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/documents/documents/RCUK%20_Policy_on_Access_to_Rese
arch_Outputs.pdf).
172
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be released to open access databases six months after publication, and (5)
legislation previously introduced in Congress would have extended the NIH
mandate to all federal agencies and reduced the holding period to six
months.
Interestingly, as Table 1 illustrates, the latency periods that have
emerged in these diverse settings are generally in the range of 6-12 months.
It hardly bears mentioning that, even at the high end, such periods are
substantially shorter than the statutory copyright term which, as discussed in
Section I above, can easily exceed a century. Though positions regarding
the optimal length of latency periods still differ, 173 it appears that the
scientific community is converging on a latency period in the range of six to
twelve months. Such convergence suggests that there are common
considerations motivating the separate negotiations174 among the different
stakeholder groups (i.e., publishers, libraries, scientists, governmental
agencies and research institutions) in each of these diverse contexts.175
B.

Optimizing Latency

How can the observed latency convergence described in the
preceding section be explained? From the standpoint of publishers, any
acceptable latency period must be sufficient to enable them to recoup at
least their first copy costs plus a reasonable profit. Beyond that point,
further returns are not required to incentivize either the production or
publication of scientific works. 176 As the latency period increases,
publishers are able to sell not only subscriptions, but also reprints, thus
increasing their value further. From the standpoint of libraries, scientists
and public advocates, the greatest value is derived when the latency period
is the shortest, making knowledge available for general use as soon as
To be sure, some commercial publishers still argue that any latency period is too
short. This position is reflected in the recently-introduced Research Works Act (H.R.
3699) discussed at notes 2-3, supra, and accompanying text.
174 I intentionally use the term “negotiating” to describe both private party
interactions and governmental rulemaking and legislation, which are deeply affected
by input from private interest groups. See, e.g., Jessica D. Litman, Copyright,
Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 870-79 (1986)
(describing the lengthy and difficult negotiations leading to the enactment of the
Copyright Act of 1976).
175 Though it has also been suggested that the observed convergence of latency
periods around the 6-12 month range may be attributable not to any inherent
efficiency associated with this time period, but, at least in part, to diffusion and the
imitation of the negotiated results of initial actors. But even if this were the case,
there would still be great value in the establishment of a commonly-adopted latency
period.
176 See Landes & Posner, supra note 52, at 50 (“even with regard to expressive works
especially vulnerable to being promptly and perfectly and widely copied …. it is
unclear that manufacturers would require copyright protection lasting more than a
few years in order to be able to recover the reasonable cost of creating the work.”)
173
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possible. The longer knowledge is withheld from the public, the less value
they obtain from it (as it becomes obsolete or superseded by later
discoveries and refinements).
Figure 1
Value as a Function of Latency
Vmax

P+S
Publishers (P)

Value
V(l)

Society (S)
lmax

Latency Period (l)

Figure 1 illustrates, in a highly stylized fashion, the value (V(l))
derived from a particular scientific article by publishers and society as a
function of latency period (l). Curve P represents the value function V(l) of
publishers. If the latency period is zero, the work will be freely copiable by
the public as soon as it is released, reducing the publisher’s value from the
work to zero. As l increases, however, the publisher is able to sell
subscriptions that include the work, together with individual reprints,
increasing V until a plateau is reached at some maximal value. Conversely,
curve S represents the value function V(l) for society. Social welfare is
greatest if the work is freely accessible as soon as it is released (l = 0), and
decreases as the latency period increases. At very long latency periods,
social value approaches zero (consider the example of Tesla noted above).
Curve P+S represents the sum of the values achieved by Publishers
and Society. The maximum of P+S is thus the value-maximizing latency
period (lmax). At this point, publishers are likely to recoup sufficient costs
and profit to enable their ongoing operations, but are unlikely to agree to
allow l to decrease further. Also at this point, the work is also sufficiently
recent to enable society to make valuable use of it.
The model described in Figure 1 is easily extrapolated from a single
scientific article to the total supply of scientific articles published by a
particular publisher. In this case, P would represent the aggregate value of
the publisher’s works, and S would represent the aggregate public benefit
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flowing from such works. The latency period would be that applied to each
article and would result in a similar P+S curve representing total value.
Likewise, a single value-maximizing latency value lmax would emerge. I
suggest that the observed latency periods between six and twelve months
described above, each of which has been privately negotiated in a different
context, represent a convergence toward an aggregate value-maximizing
lmax for scientific publishing.177 In other words, an “optimal” latency period
for scientific publishing.

VI.

TOWARD A PRIVATELY-ORDERED SOLUTION

If an optimal latency period does exist with respect to scientific
publishing, and if lmax indicates the appropriate length of the exclusivity
term that should be afforded to scientific publications, then there are several
potential applications of this observation in addressing the market
inefficiencies caused by the serials crisis. One could point to this period in
arguing for a legislative reduction of the copyright term for scientific
journal articles. Such a legislative proposal might look similar to Shavell’s
proposal to abolish copyright in academic works altogether, but would
avoid some of the challenges of that proposal.178 Nevertheless, as discussed
in Section II.C above, the tailoring of intellectual property rights through
legislative reform is difficult and uncertain to achieve desired efficiency
gains. Likewise, the observed optimal latency period could be used as a
basis for further agency mandates, such as the expansion of the NIH OA
Policy to other agencies. But while the NIH OA Policy has been a great
success, as discussed in Section IV.B, such policies are subject to political
vagaries and cannot be depended upon in the long run. Thus, I propose a
latency-based private ordering approach to address the serials crisis and
attendant social welfare deficit.
A.

The Role and Nature of Private Ordering

Not surprisingly, the publishing industry continues to take a public position that
one year is too short a period to recoup publishing costs. See Assn. of American
Publishers, The Impact of the NIH Public Access Policy on Professional and Scholarly
Publishing (available at http://www.publishers.org/issues/5/9/) (visited August 18,
2012) (“[i]n the life sciences, on average, only 60% of an article’s lifetime usage takes
place in the first year of publication, leaving 40% commercial value of an article lost
when it is available free 12 months after publication, [and] only 15% of the value of an
article in American Psychological Association (APA) journals is recouped after the
first year of publication”).
178 Reducing copyright in scientific works to one year instead of eliminating it
altogether would enable publishers to recoup costs and continue to operate without
radically altering the financial model of the publishing industry (i.e., by changing the
entire industry from a reader-pays to an author-pays model), thus avoiding the
uncertainty and instability that such a change might bring.
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The term ‘private ordering’ refers to rules systems that are
conceived, observed and often enforced by private actors through extralegal means. Since Robert Ellickson’s seminal study of the unwritten code
governing the behavior of cattlemen and farmers in rural California, 179 a
large body of scholarship has grown in this area. Commentators have
analyzed private ordering systems employed by groups ranging from
Hassidic diamond wholesalers, 180 Memphis cotton merchants 181 and
Japanese organized crime syndicates 182 to the privately-chartered Internet
domain name authority ICANN, 183 the New York Stock Exchange 184 and
modern credit rating agencies. 185 While these communities vary
dramatically in their composition, goals and patterns of interaction, they
share a single, notable trait: the substitution of internally-administered rules
for governmentally-imposed rules.
In economic terms, private ordering solutions arise when
governmental allocations of rights have proven inefficient. The Coase
Theorem, as it has come to be known, holds that in the absence of
transaction costs, parties will bargain to the same efficient outcomes
regardless of the initial allocation of rights. 186 This reasoning has been used
to argue that uniformly broad intellectual property rights will not
necessarily lead to uniformity costs and diminished social welfare, so long
as parties are free to bargain to an efficient outcome. 187 Of course, it is
generally acknowledged that transaction costs in intellectual property
transactions are non-zero, and today, according to Carroll, “most agree that
difficulties in valuing patents and copyrights raise transaction costs to the
point that allocative efficiency will depend upon the content of intellectual
property entitlements.” 188 But even in the face of inefficient initial
allocations of intellectual property rights, private ordering can play a role in
reallocating resources to their most efficient usage. As such, private
ordering can serve as a robust alternative to governmental tailoring of
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992)
181 Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001)
182 Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41 (2000).
183 James Boyle, Governance of the Internet: A Nondelegation Doctrine for the Digital
Age?, 50 DUKE L.J. 5 (2000).
184 Jonathan R. Macey, Symposium: Public and Private Ordering and The Production Of
Legitimate And Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (1997).
185 Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2002).
186 See NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO
POST-MODERNISM 67 (1997).
187 See Carroll, Uniformity Cost, supra note 85, at 859.
188 Carroll, Uniformity Cost, supra note 85, at 859 (citing Clarissa Long, Proprietary
Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 EMORY L.J. 823, 828-29 (2000)).
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intellectual property rights. 189 In the following Sections, I will outline a
private ordering approach to scientific publishing that draws upon the
observed latency periods identified above.

B.

The Problem of Collective Action

As described in Section V.A, various stakeholder groups involved in
scientific publishing have converged on a latency period in the range of 612 months. Yet the adoption of solutions based on this period has been
fragmented, and such solutions benefit only a fraction of the overall
publishing market. Thus, the NIH OA Policy, perhaps the most influential
initiative to adopt a latency period, only affects biomedical literature
generated by NIH-funded researcher. Voluntary OA policies implemented
by member-based societies only affect those journals and members of those
societies. And OA mandates adopted by individual institutions only affect
research generated by researchers within those institutions. Thus, despite
the seeming trend toward the adoption of latency periods, the benefits and
burdens of this approach are spread unevenly across the scientific
community.190
Putting aside for the moment funder and governmental OA
mandates, which, as discussed above, may not be sufficiently robust to
suffice as long-term solutions to the serials crisis, it is instructive to
consider the position of a hypothetical research institution, State U.
Assume that the administration of State U is both familiar with the serials
crisis and that State U has been affected by the crisis through its own
library’s cutbacks. Assume also that State U has some number of faculty
members whose research is funded by non-NIH sources and who wish to
submit articles to scientific journals published by P, a commercial
publisher. What incentive does State U have to approach P to negotiate an
arrangement whereby its faculty publications would be released on an OA
basis? Let us assume that State U already has a subscription to P’s journals.
The benefit of P’s OA release of those articles would inure not to State U,
but to other institutions, such as City College, who choose not to subscribe
to P’s journals (either because they are unable to afford them or because
See Carroll, One Size, supra note 84, at 1393 (“the theoretical advantages of publicly
tailored rights are minimized by tailoring through private ordering supported by
judicial and other public enforcement.”)
190 For example, an NIH researcher at Harvard Medical School who published a paper
in the New England Journal of Medicine would, knowingly or not, be participating in
three separate instances of private ordering with respect to the publication of that
paper: through the NIH OA Policy, through NEJM’s voluntary OA policy, and through
Harvard’s OA mandate. On the other hand, a psychology researcher at a small
Midwestern college whose research was funded by the American Psychiatric
Association and who published his work in Elsevier’s Cognitive Psychology would
engage in none of these private ordering solutions.
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they choose to allocate their available funds to different journals).
Moreover, State U’s faculty would likely perceive a risk from their
university administration attempting to negotiate an OA arrangement with
P, as those negotiations could be unsuccessful and potentially result in P’s
retaliation against State U faculty members by rejecting their submissions.
Based on these considerations, State U has little incentive, individually, to
negotiate an OA arrangement with P and, in fact, faces a disincentive in
terms of the perceived risk incurred by its own faculty. Thus, given the
time, effort and legal expense required to engage in such negotiations, and
the fact that such negotiations would need to be conducted not only with P,
but also with other publishers (Q, R and S), it is not surprising that State U
will generally decline to engage in such negotiations.191
The example of State U reveals the classic collective action problem
described by Mancur Olson in 1965:
If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize
their personal welfare, they will not act to advance their
common or group objectives unless there is coercion to
force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive,
distinct from the achievement of the common or group
interest, is offered to members of the group individually on
the condition that they help bear the costs or burdens
involved in the achievement of the group objectives …
These points hold true even when there is unanimous
agreement in a group about the common good and the
methods of achieving it.192
In effect, Olson’s insight is that individuals will not act to achieve a
common goal unless they have individual incentives to do so, the
achievement of the common good being insufficient to motivate their action.
This observation is borne out by the relatively modest take-up of the open
access publishing models described in Section III. Accordingly, for any
See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 62, at 402-03 (in the case of research materials
(e.g., biological samples) and databases, universities are most likely to act in their own
self-interest, without regard to “the research needs of the larger community”) .
The counter-example, of course, is “H”, a large and prestigious university that
engages in such negotiations out of a commitment to principle and with sufficient
confidence in its own bargaining position, and the indispensability of its own faculty
to the publishing enterprise, that it sees little risk in doing so. See Erik Priest, supra
note 144, at x.
192 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION – PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 2 (2d ed. 1971). Olson’s quotation summarizes the collective action problem
raised by self-interested action by group members. This problem is distinct from the
better-known collective action problem arising from informational deficits among
group members, as exemplified by the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma game. See
generally, RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 202 (1994).
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private ordering solution to address the serials crisis effectively, it must
overcome this collective action barrier.
Two classic “solutions” to the collective action problem involve
state action and firm action.193 In the selection quoted above, Olson himself
recognizes the power of the state to compel private actors to cooperate for
the public good. This “solution”, however, is not always palatable to the
members of the community and, as discussed above, is dependent on
political exigencies. Likewise, theories of firm action posit the intervention
of an entrepreneur who organizes and compensates members of the
community in pursuit of an efficient result. Neither of these “solutions” has
obvious applicability to the collective action problem manifested by the
serials crisis.
Elinor Ostrom, however, poses a third alternative to influencing
collective action in the context of common resources: the shaping of
norms. 194 As defined by Ostrom and Sue Crawford, “norms” are
“prescriptions held by an individual that an action or outcome in a situation
must, must not, or may be permitted”. 195 However, unlike formal rules,
norms are not backed by binding enforcement mechanisms. 196 She
explains, first by recasting Olson, and then by introducing the possibility of
changing the norms that otherwise would drive group members toward their
own self-interested, but less socially-valuable, positions:
This points to the importance of larger institutions that
enable participants in social dilemma situations to have
sufficient autonomy that they can change the rules that
affect their ongoing situations … [M]any individuals have
crafted ingenious institutions that help them reach mutually
productive rather than mutually unproductive outcomes.197
As discussed below, changing norms will play an important role in
addressing the collective action problem in scientific publishing.

C.

A Private Ordering Proposal: A One-Year Latency-Based License

As discussed in Section I.C.1, copyright term is not the only culprit
behind the serials crisis. A related factor that has enabled publishers to
exert significant control over the dissemination of scientific information is
These two approaches are summarized in ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS –
THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 40-41 (1990).
194 See ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 121 (2005).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 149-50.
197 Id, at 132.
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the transfer of copyright by authors to publishers. The transfer of copyright,
by definition, gives a publisher the exclusive right to exploit a work during
its full copyright term. Assuming that copyright term will remain at its
current duration for the foreseeable future, an author could seek to limit a
publisher’s control over the dissemination of a work by contractually
limiting the amount of time that the publisher has control over
dissemination of the work. Specifically, rather than assigning the copyright
in the work to the publisher, the author could grant the publisher a license.
A license is simply a contractual right to exercise one or more intellectual
property rights during a specified period of time. An appropriate license to
publish a scientific article might grant the publisher the exclusive right to
reproduce and distribute the work during some period (e.g., the previouslyidentified one year latency period), followed by a non-exclusive right to
reproduce and distribute the work during the remainder of the copyright
term.198
Such a publication license (which I term a “Latency-Based
License”) would provide the publisher with all necessary rights to exploit
the work (i.e., to reproduce and distribute it) throughout the copyright term.
In addition, during the latency period, the publisher’s right would be
exclusive, meaning that neither the author nor any third party could legally
reproduce or distribute the work. Moreover, while the license remained
exclusive, the publisher would have the right to enforce the copyright in the
article against infringers (unauthorized copiers).199 After the latency period,
however, though the publisher would retain a right to publish and exploit
the work, it would no longer have the exclusive right to do so, nor to enforce
the copyright against infringers.200 Accordingly, after the exclusivity period
the author would have the right to reproduce and distribute the work freely
and could, if he wished, grant this right to others with or without
compensation. Such distribution could be accomplished through Green OA
self-archiving, a centralized repository such as PubMed Central, or through
a Gold open access journal.

A similar licensing proposal has been made in the Netherlands by the SURF
Foundation working with the UK Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC). See
SURF, License to Publish (available at
http://www.surf.nl/auteursrechten/en/landschap/relationships/authorpublisher/P
ages/Licence-to-Publish.aspx) (visited August 18, 2012) (proposing a 6-month
latency period).
199 17 U.S.C. 501(b) (conferring standing to sue on the “legal and beneficial owner of
an exclusive right under copyright”).
200 Publishers, of course, may own the copyright in the collective work constituting a
particular issue of a journal. See 17 U.S.C. Sec. 101 (defining “collective work” to
include periodical issues). However, in the Internet age, it is more likely that
individual articles, rather than traditional journal “issues” would be the subject of
most copying.
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One important right restored to the author under the Latency-Based
License would be the right to disaggregate article content for repurposing,
excerption, aggregation, annotation, searching, indexing and other uses.
Such rights are becoming increasingly important as online tools grow in
sophistication. For example, journal articles often contain data-rich figures
with meaningful captions. Yet captions are not searchable in most online
articles. In fact, many online journal articles are not full-text searchable at
all, and search engines are limited to indexing of abstracts and journalidentified keywords. Journals have been reluctant to permit full-text
indexing of articles and uploading of article text to semantic databases that
would enable sophisticated data mining. Instead, researchers are often
required to identify articles via abstract searching, and then inefficiently
scan or search articles individually using desktop tools such as Adobe
Acrobat Reader. Under the Latency-Based License approach, authors
would have the right to authorize the disaggregation of article content in
order to facilitate sophisticated searching and data mining following
expiration of the latency period.
A Latency-Based License approach would complement, not replace,
institutional and funder OA mandates. Though the license would restore
copyright control to the author after the latency period, it would not require
the author to make his or her work publicly accessible. This important
component of the open access equation must still be supplied by institutions
and funders that can impose such requirements on individual researchers.201
While the use of a Latency-Based License by an individual author
when publishing a particular article would ensure the free accessibility of
that article, the goal of this proposal is to effect a change more broadly
within the scientific publishing industry. Thus, I propose that research
institutions, as a group, adopt a standardized Latency-Based License for use
by researchers when publishing their scientific articles. I propose that the
latency period for this standardized license be set, at least initially, at one
year, which reflects the negotiated (and possibly value-maximizing) period
observed in the scientific publishing industry. In the weak version of this
proposal, institutions would make this template Latency-Based License
available to their researchers and encourage its use. In the strong version,
use of the Latency-Based License by researchers would be mandated by
institutions.202
Such measures may also be needed to prod apathetic researchers to make their
works available after the expiration of the one-year latency period, after they have
moved on to other projects and have potentially forgotten about previouslypublished, but newly “freed” articles. (Thanks to Eric Priest for this insight).
202 Debate continues regarding the advisability of permitting researchers to “opt out”
of institutional open access mandates. One of the principal critiques of Harvard-style
mandates is that they permit faculty members to opt-out of OA requirements with
little inconvenience, thus encouraging authors to take the path of least resistance,
which often means acceding to whatever terms a publisher offers in order to expedite
201
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Evaluating the Latency-Based License as a Tailoring Solution

The Latency-Based License that I propose in Section C above is a
privately-ordered means of tailoring publishers’ intellectual property rights
in scientific literature that can replace the publishing industry’s current
copyright assignment model. This proposal is intended to increase the
quantity of public scientific knowledge and thereby increase net social
welfare,203 without unduly burdening the publishing industry or disrupting
the production of scientific literature. In analyzing this proposal, it is
instructive to consider its potential costs and benefits in terms of Carroll’s
three-part tailoring framework. On the basis of this analysis, which is
described below, I believe that the proposed Latency-Based License is
likely to be effective in reducing uniformity costs and increasing overall
social welfare, introduces few administrative hurdles and is politically
feasible to implement.204
1.

Effectiveness.

a.
As compared to assignment of copyright to the
publisher. If we acknowledge that copyright duration gives rise to
uniformity costs in the market for scientific publishing, 205 we must ask
whether the proposed Latency-Based License is likely to be effective in
the publication of one’s article. See Shavell, supra note 78, at x. The question of
permitting opt-outs from a mandatory Latency-Based License structure would need
to be considered carefully during the development of any template Latency-Based
License.
203 The idea of a contractually-based commons is not new. See Reichman & Uhlir,
supra note 62 (arguing for a contract-based commons of scientific research data),
Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in
Patent Law, 58 Emory L.J. 889, 917 (2009) (describing efforts by patient groups to use
contractual means to ensure access to patents) and Michael J. Madison, Brett M.
Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cultural
Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010) (identifying various “constructed”
cultural commons).
204 It is possible that antitrust concerns may be raised with respect to the collective
action taken by institutions in developing and/or adopting an industry-wide form of
Latency-Based License. While a full analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this
paper, I believe that such concerns would not be justified, as the development of a
non-binding industry-wide template agreement would be unlikely to harm
competition either among publishers or research institutions, or to exert undue
collective pressure on any cognizable market. Cf. European Commission, Guidelines
on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements ¶301 (2011) (“As long as participation
in the actual establishment of standard terms is unrestricted for the competitors in
the relevant market (either by participation in the trade association or directly), and
the established standard terms are non-binding and effectively accessible for anyone,
such agreements are not likely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition.”)
205 See notes 85-86, supra, and accompanying text.
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reducing this uniformity cost. One of the primary differences between the
proposed Latency-Based License and the current regime in scientific
publishing is the limitation of publishers’ exclusive rights to a latency
period of one year, rather than the full copyright term (life of the author plus
seventy years). This one-year period was selected based on the observations
described in Section V.B above, which supply the “evidentiary basis” for
tailoring called for by Carroll.206 Yet, such evidence alone is not sufficient
to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Latency-Based License proposal. In
analyzing it further, the effect of this proposal on three principal
constituencies (readers, authors and publishers) must be considered.
It is relatively straightforward that the proposed Latency-Based
License, if broadly adopted, would increase the quantity of scientific
literature available to readers, as distribution and publication of the
literature could be conducted freely after the expiration of the latency
period. Absent countervailing factors, social welfare measured by reader
access to knowledge would increase under the proposed regime.
The impact of the proposed Latency-Based License on authors and
publishers is somewhat entwined. If publishers have only one year of
exclusivity in the articles that they publish, then, in order to continue to
provide the services that they currently provide,207 they will need to recoup
their costs plus a reasonable profit during this abbreviated exclusivity
period. Commercial publisher revenue today consists of three principal
components: subscriptions, reprints and advertising. I will analyze these in
turn.
The largest component of commercial scientific publishing revenue
is attributable to subscriptions (85% according to Page, Campbell and
Meadows). Even if articles become available on an OA basis one year after
initial publication, some percentage of researchers will still demand access
to articles as soon as they are published and will be unwilling to wait to
access them until after the latency period. 208 It is thus possible that the
number of subscribers will remain relatively close to their pre-adjustment
See Carroll, One Size, supra note 84, at x.
I assume that it is socially desirable for publishers’ intermediation services to exist.
See notes and accompanying discussion.
208 There are many reasons why researchers would not wish to wait until the
expiration of a latency period to access articles, particularly those that are closely
related to their own research. The two most prominent reasons for this impatience
are the need for researchers to cite the most current literature in their own papers
and in grant applications. In each case, it would be embarrassing at best for a peer
reviewer to identify recent literature of which the author/applicant is unaware. Most
importantly, such an omission could signal to reviewers that the author/applicant is
not fully conversant with the literature in the field, a damning conclusion that could
lead either to rejection of an article or a critical deduction from a grant application
score.
206
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values and publishers’ percentage drop-off in subscription revenue will be
relatively small. While more empirical research is needed, support for this
conclusion can be found by examining the effect that the adoption of the
mandatory NIH OA Policy has had on subscriptions for biomedical
literature.209 Existing data indicate that the largest commercial publishers of
biomedical journals suffered no noticeable drop-off in subscription revenue
in the two years immediately following NIH’s adoption of its mandatory
OA policy.210 In fact, the revenue of the two largest scientific publishers in
the medical field, Elsevier and Wolters Kluwer, increased slightly from
2008 to 2009. Thus, while publishers may see some drop-off of subscription
revenue from institutions who value particular publications at the margin, it
is likely that subscription revenue will remain relatively stable under a
publishing agreement incorporating a latency period of one year.211
Advertising rates are typically tied to a journal’s subscription base.
To the extent that journal subscriptions do not drop significantly as a result
of the public release of articles after the latency period, one would not
expect to see a significant drop in advertising revenue.
The most significant area in which journals are likely to see revenue
reductions stemming from post-exclusivity open access is reprints. As
noted in Section I.B.2, publishers earn reprint revenue both from traditional
print reprints (additional “glossy” copies of articles that authors have
traditionally sent to colleagues) and, more importantly today, one-time
access charges for online versions of articles. Once an article becomes
publicly-available, it is unlikely that a non-subscribing researcher who
needs access to the article will pay the journal for it. Thus, a publisher will
only have the opportunity to earn reprint revenue from articles only during
the latency period. Assuming that the useful life of an article is longer than
one year, and that demand for copies of the article will continue for some
years following the expiration of the latency period, some loss of reprint
revenue would be expected and the percentage by which publisher reprint
revenue drops following a shift to an early-release model is likely to be
relatively high. However, because reprint revenue represents only a small
percentage of overall journal revenue (8% according to Page, Campbell and
Meadows), even a steep decline in reprint revenue would not have a great
impact on overall journal revenue.

As discussed in Section IV.A, the NIH OA Policy requires that all articles based on
research funded by NIH must be deposited into NIH’s publicly-accessible PubMed
Central repository within one year following initial publication.
210 See Dorsey et al., supra note 44, at Fig. 2.
211 Likewise, in each of the other cases cited in Section V.B in which a latency period
has been observed, I am unaware of any reported impact on publisher revenue or
profit.
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Based on this analysis, it is likely that commercial publishers faced
with a regime in which they enjoy exclusive rights to publish articles for
only one year would not suffer significant declines in subscription or
advertising revenue, and any reduction in reprint revenue would amount to
a small percentage of the whole. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that
such a shift would allow journals to continue to recoup their costs plus a
reasonable profit. This conclusion is borne out by the observed convergence
of the industry in independent negotiations on such a latency period. If
publishers do not experience significant financial distress from this shift and
thus maintain current publishing models, authors are also unlikely to reduce
their output of research articles.
Thus, the proposed shift from a copyright assignment regime to a
more limited Latency-Based License regime is likely to produce net social
welfare gains: public access to scientific literature will increase, publishers
will experience minor losses of reprint revenue but will otherwise maintain
near-current levels of revenue and profitability, and author output of articles
is unlikely to change.
b.
As compared to a zero-copyright regime. In assessing
the proposed intellectual property tailoring solution it is also useful to
compare its likely efficiency gains with those of Shavell’s copyright
abolition proposal. As discussed in Section II, abolishing copyright in
academic works would make those works available to the public
immediately, thus enhancing social welfare from the outset, whereas the
proposed Latency-Based License would not result in the release of works
until the expiration of the latency period, yielding a deferred social welfare
gain. 212 Thus, viewing only the effect on readers, the Shavell proposal
appears to result in greater welfare gains. However, as discussed in Section
II, abolishing academic copyright would push the publishing market toward
an author-pays model with unpredictable consequences for authors. If
author charges were raised high enough, the production of academic works
could be diminished, resulting in a social welfare deficit. Thus, it is
unclear whether an abolition approach would yield a net social benefit or
cost, whereas it is likely that the proposed Latency-Based License would
yield a net social benefit.
Moreover, the proposed Latency-Based License has the virtue of
preserving stability in the market and would not result in a significant
disruption of existing market roles or dynamics. A broad market shift from
I have previously argued that delaying the addition of knowledge to an information
commons diminishes the total quantity of knowledge within the commons at a given
point in time, making its contents less valuable than they would have been absent
such delay. See Contreras, Latency Analysis, supra note 147, at x. However, this
tradeoff may be justified to achieve policy compromises that enable the creation of
the commons in the first place.
212
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a reader-pays to an author-pays model, however, has never been attempted,
and the results are unpredictable. While some element of uncertainty is
inherent in any proposal for legal change, assuming other factors are equal,
the preferable approach is often the one that introduces less volatility to the
market.
c.
As compared to existing OA models. As noted above,
the Latency-Based License would restore to the author rights in his or her
work following the expiration of the latency period. At that time, the author
would be free to distribute the work via a Green OA self-archiving platform
or via other means. Proponents of Green OA might ask why the LatencyBased License is preferable to approaches such as the SPARC Addendum,
which are currently in use and already reserve to the author the right to selfarchive his or her work. There are several important differences between
current Green OA approaches and the Latency-Based License. First, the
Latency-Based License does more than reserve a non-exclusive selfarchiving right to the author, it restores to the author full copyright
ownership, with all concomitant rights including the right to enable
disaggregation and searching of content. Second, upon the restoration of
these rights, the author has the ability to distribute the final, published
version of his or her work, not a less citable pre-print or post-print version.
Finally, the Latency-Based License approach creates a framework for
establishing a uniform latency period across the entire industry, eliminating
the effects of disparities in institutional negotiating power.
The proposed Latency-Based License also has advantages over
existing Gold OA models, as it would enable the current publishing
infrastructure to continue to operate without a radical (and unpredictable)
shift in publishing economics.
2.
Administrability. The second prong of Carroll’s tailoring
framework requires an assessment of the ease and cost of administering the
proposed Latency-Based License proposal. The Latency-Based License is a
contractual private ordering solution that does not depend on the
amendment or enactment of laws, rules or regulations. As such, it has both
strengths and weaknesses as compared to a legislative solution. The most
notable benefit of a legislative solution over a private ordering solution is
that the former automatically applies to all parties within the jurisdiction,
whereas the latter must be implemented party-by-party on a piecemeal
basis. It is for this reason that Carroll suggests that in some cases, private
ordering may viewed as less efficient, or more costly, than the
establishment of broadly-applicable rules. 213 However, this inefficiency

See Carroll, One Size, supra note 84, at 1399 (“to the extent that transaction costs
limit the scope of effective private ordering, some progress toward the theoretical
ideal of tailored rights can be made when rights are defined as formally uniform while
213
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occurs when multiple individual parties are required to bargain separately
with each other to achieve the desired result, thereby increasing overall
transaction costs. The proposed Latency-Based License is intended to
remain uniform across all transactions (other than in the details of the
specific work, author and journal). Thus, the aggregate effect of multiple
licenses between institutions and publishers more closely resembles that of
a broadly-applicable rule than a multiplicity of individual transactions. For
this reason it is generally acknowledged that the use of standardized
contracting forms is both an efficient and effective means of establishing
relationships between parties.214 Thus, individual and aggregate transaction
costs under the proposed Latency-Based License regime should not be any
greater than they are under the copyright assignment regime in place today,
and would likely be less (as publisher assignment agreements are not
themselves uniform and thus require legal resources to review and
interpret).
In fact, the very need for legislation to be generally applicable
highlights a significant advantage of the Latency-Based License over the
abolition of academic copyright. While the legislative proposal would
require Congress to define, and courts to interpret, new categories of
material exempt from copyright protection (with the attendant line-drawing
difficulties noted above), 215 each Latency-Based License would apply
unambiguously to a particular scientific article. There would be little doubt
when or how to apply the license to the work, as there could be if the work
were instead subject to a broad statutory exclusion. And although disputes
will invariably arise between contracting parties, courts are accustomed to
engaging in contractual interpretation. In contrast, courts interpreting a new
statutory exception have no direct precedent to guide them. Thus,
unburdened by the administrative and interpretive difficulties that would
necessarily attend the abolition of academic copyright, the proposed
Latency-Based License would be highly administrable.
3.
Political Economy. Unlike the proposal to abolish copyright
in academic works, the private ordering solution proposed in this article
would require little political or legislative action.
As such, its
implementation is far more feasible from a political economy standpoint
than the copyright abolition proposal, and even than efforts to expand
agency mandates beyond the NIH OA Policy.

incorporating features that yield differential results in how the rights actually
function”).
214 See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 362-63
(1960) (“[t]he content of the standardized terms accumulates experience, it avoids or
reduces legal risks and also confers all kinds of operating leeways and advantages, all
without need of either consulting counsel from instance to instance or of bargaining
with the other parties”).
215 See Section II.B.2, supra.
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Collective Action and Changing Norms

In order to effectuate a wholesale change in the market for scientific
literature and thereby reverse the impact of the serials crisis, a substantial
number of research institutions would need to endorse and adopt the
proposed Latency-Based License. Yet, as discussed in Section VI.B, there
has historically been little incentive for individual research institutions to
negotiate with publishers over access to published articles. Such
negotiations are perceived to be time-consuming, resource-intensive and
potentially prejudicial to the interests of researchers at those institutions.
Thus, despite the general social welfare gains that could be achieved
through broad adoption and use of the Latency-Based License, a collective
action problem must be overcome for such an approach to be successful.
Responding to the collective action dilemma articulated by Olson,
Ostrom suggests that the shifting of group norms may foster collective
action.216 But how does one go about changing norms in the face of the
resistance noted above? Below is a suggested approach to developing and
implementing the proposed Latency-Based License regime in scientific
publishing that takes these measures into account.
1.
Drafting a Consensus-Based License. The first step in
fostering the adoption of a Latency-Based License will be the development
of a broadly-accepted model agreement template. Such a template could
then be used by all research institutions and publishers without the
investment of significant legal or managerial resources. A major advantage
of using an industry-wide agreement template is that it gives all market
participants equal information about major terms and sets expectations
accordingly. Thus, with the bilateral university-publisher agreements
described in Section III.B.4 above, institutions lack information regarding
the terms negotiated with publishers by peer institutions, and each
institution is left to negotiate in an informational vacuum. With a
standardized template agreement, each institution begins from the same
base of knowledge and can be assured that the terms offered are consistent
and reasonable.
Industry-specific template agreements have been adopted
successfully in a number of different fields from online advertising 217 to

See notes 194-195, supra, and accompanying text.
See Interactive Advertising Bureau, Standard Terms and Conditions for Internet
Advertising
for
Media
Buys
One
Year
or
Less
Version 3.0 - Dec 2009 (available at http://www.iab.net/guidelines/508676/tscs3).
216
217
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residential real estate purchases.218 In addition, cross-industry agreements,
most notably the Creative Commons suite of content licenses, 219 have
gained widespread acceptance. The licensing of a scientific article to a
publisher is a relatively straightforward legal transaction, and there is no
technical reason that a template agreement could not be developed for this
purpose.
A key element in the development of a successful template
agreement is participation by a broad cross-section of the industry. Broad
participation both invests multiple participants in the success of the
enterprise and makes it more likely that they will themselves be leaders in
adopting the resulting product. Though it may seem counter-intuitive, not
only researchers but publishers should be invited to participate in the
development of the Latency-Based License template. Such participation
will mute later complaints of process bias and unfairness, and will enable
publishers to voice legitimate concerns regarding the terms to which they
will be expected to accede. Even if publishers do not meaningfully
participate in the drafting, they will be less likely to raise claims of
exclusion if they are invited to do so. And though large commercial
publishers may be resistant to changing the industry’s current intellectual
property regime, it is possible that a Latency-Based License approach may
gain support among association and learned society publishers, thus
weakening objections that may later be raised by commercial publishers.
The process of drafting and agreeing upon a template agreement can
take months or years, and is best organized by a neutral body that
commands some level of respect in the field. For example, a committee of
the American Bar Association (ABA) acted as the “convenor” in drafting
the Model Trading Partner Agreement for Electronic Data Interchange
(EDI).220 With respect to a template Latency-Based License for scientific
publishing, various potential conveners come to mind, including the ABA,
open licensing groups such as Creative Commons, broad-based scientific
associations such as the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS), and archive-focused organizations such as the Scholarly
Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition (SPARC).
One important strategic decision that the project organizers must
make is whether one or more governmental agencies or non-profit funders
See, e.g., Cal. Assn. Realtors, California Residential Purchase Agreement and Joint
Escrow
Instructions
(available
at
http://bankerrealty.com/CALF.%20PURCHASE%20AGR.pdf).
219 See www.creativecommons.org/licenses/. See generally Michael W. Carroll,
Creative Commons and the New Intermediaries, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 45.
220 See JANE KAUFMAN WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 5-62
(2004 update) and Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Commercial Use of
Electronic Data Interchange – A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 BUS.
LAWYER 1645 (1990).
218
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should be involved in the drafting effort. Obvious candidates would include
NIH and the Wellcome Trust, both of which have been active in advocating
for greater open access to the scientific literature. While, the involvement
of a large funder would probably command greater attention from the
industry, such involvement would also have the potential to politicize the
drafting process. Thus, the advantages and drawbacks of involving a large
funder in this activity should be weighed carefully.
2.
Achieving Adoption – Nudging Norms. Once a template
Latency-Based License template has been developed and approved by the
drafting group, it can be “rolled out” for use by researchers submitting
articles to journals. In order to realize the potential efficiency gains of such
an approach, the use of the Latency-Based License template must be
adopted by a broad segment of the scientific community and used in place
of publishers’ current copyright assignments. In effect, the basic legal
model for scientific publishing, and the assumptions underlying that model,
must change. Changing long-held assumptions and practices, of course, is
not easy, but below are a few suggested approaches:
a.
Following the Leader. A handful of large research
institutions have already shown strong public support for open access
initiatives from self-archiving to their own institutional mandates.221 It is
likely that these leader institutions would also represent the first wave to
adopt the proposed Latency-Based License. However, it may not be
obvious to smaller or less research-focused institution that such an approach
will be fruitful or worth the effort for them. Moreover, researchers at
smaller institutions are likely to be more susceptible to fears of retaliation
by publishers, and thus less inclined to use the new template unless required
to do so. Thus, leader institutions should offer support and advice to other
institutions regarding administrative steps that can be taken to adopt the
new approach as smoothly as possible. Their example can also demonstrate
that immediate publisher reprisals will not necessarily flow from use of the
new model.222 Once leader institutions have begun the process of shifting to
the new intellectual property model, norms will already have begun to shift
in this area.
b.
Following the Money. Though the proposed shift to a
Latency-Based License does not require direct action by governmental or
non-profit funders of scientific research, funders can lend significant
support to this effort. Such support can come in two forms: general public
endorsements by high-ranking agency officials, and express
acknowledgements that use of a Latency-Based License would either be
See Sections III.B.1 and III.B.4, supra.
I am aware of no evidence that Harvard, MIT or other large research institutions
have been disadvantaged by publishers as a result of their existing open access
mandates.
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acceptable or preferred when complying with funder OA mandates. For
example, NIH could encourage the use of a Latency-Based License in lieu
of the limited publisher submission to PubMed Central that currently
occurs.223 At some point, if the Latency-Based License achieved significant
adoption, NIH could even specify its use in satisfying the requirements of
the NIH OA mandate.
c.
Emphasizing (Individual) Efficiencies. Absent
coercion, individual actors are most likely to be persuaded to act to achieve
a public goal if they receive an individual incentive for doing so. Under the
“theory of the firm” strategy, an entrepreneurial organizer will compensate
individual group members to entice them to work toward an efficiencyenhancing public goal.224 Absent direct compensation, individual members
of the group must be persuaded that it is in their individual self-interest to
work toward the public goal.
In the case of shifting the scientific publishing market toward use of
a uniform Latency-Based License template, such individual incentives do
exist. These include the reduction of both transaction costs and transactional
uncertainty. Currently, every scientific publisher uses a similar, but slightly
different, set of legal instruments to acquire the copyright in articles that it
agrees to publish. In the first instance, these legal instruments are provided
to researchers at some point during the publication process. Most scientists
lack the legal training to understand either the language or the legal
ramifications of the documents that they are asked to sign. Upon receiving
these documents, researchers are thus presented with two imperfect options:
either sign the documents and hope for the best, or refer them to the
institution’s legal counsel for review. The first option could result in
unintended negative consequences, as the documents are drafted by the
publisher and likely to take positions as favorable to the publisher’s
interests as possible. The second option would add time (a drawback form
the researcher’s standpoint) and cost (a drawback from the institution’s
standpoint). Even worse, the reviewing legal counsel might recommend (or
require) that the publisher’s agreement be amended in some way before
execution, leading to the researcher’s expenditure of more time and effort
and, worse still, the publisher’s possible withdrawal of the publication offer.
The use of a uniform template Latency-Based License would reduce
each of these costs dramatically. First, transactional uncertainty would be
avoided, as the template agreement would be uniform across all publication
transactions and its effect would be well-understood by institutional
counsel. An institution could thus advise its researchers to sign any
Latency-Based License that conformed to the approved template without
further legal review. Second, transaction costs would be reduced, as the
223
224

See Section IV.B.2, supra.
See note 193, supra, and accompanying text
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need for legal review of publication agreements would be more limited once
all transactions were conducted using the standardized template agreement.
3.
Precedents in Law and Licensing. While the copyright
assignment model currently employed by the scientific publishing industry
has been in place for decades, the use of this model is not standard
throughout the larger publishing industry. For example, trade book
publishers typically seek only a license to publish a book, though this
license may be exclusive with respect to certain markets, geographies or
formats (e.g., hardcover, paperback, audiobook, digital download, etc.).
Thus, there is no “magic” to the scientific publishing industry’s legal
approach: it is simply the product of industry custom and usage, and can be
changed.
While it is true that bringing about new norms of interaction could
initially meet resistance, there are numerous precedents suggesting that such
a shift in the scientific publishing market is not beyond reach. As discussed
in Section III.B.1, many universities already encourage their faculty to
utilize the SPARC Addendum or a similar document to reserve selfarchiving rights for published articles, and many publishers have honored
such requests.225 Similarly, in 2007 a group of major research universities
and associations adopted a document entitled Nine Points to Consider in
Licensing University Technology.226 The Nine Points document responded
to growing concerns over the commercial influence on university
technology transfer practices and contained recommendations to university
licensing officers regarding the retention of teaching and research rights,
ensuring broad access to research tools and meeting the needs of neglected
populations. Since its release, nearly 100 institutions worldwide have
formally adopted the Nine Points document, and it has become a standard
fixture in the discussion of university technology licensing.227
Even more relevant is the experience in academic legal publishing.
In the past, academic legal journals (law reviews) required that authors
assign copyright to them, much as scientific journals do today.228 However,
beginning in the early 1990s, a small number of law professors began to
object to this practice.229 The number of dissenters grew, and in 1996 the
See note 124, supra, and accompanying text
In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology
(Mar. 6, 2007) (available at http://www.autm.net/Nine_Points_to_Consider.htm).
227 See Assn. University Tech. Managers, Endorse the Nine Points to Consider
(available
at
https://www.autm.net/source/NinePoints/ninepoints_endorsement.cfm)
(visited
August 18, 2012) (listing 99 signatories to the Nine Points document).
228 See generally, Benjamin J. Keele, Copyright Provisions in Law Journal Publication
Agreements, 102 L. LIBRARY J. 269 (2010) and Michael W. Carroll, The Movement for
Open Access Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741, 754 (2006).
229 E-mail correspondence with Professor Mark A. Lemley (on file with author).
225
226

SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING - CONTRERAS

65

American Association of Law Schools (AALS) appointed a Special
Committee to develop a model publication agreement for law reviews.230
The committee’s work resulted in a model Author/Journal Agreement
(AJA) that was released in 1998. The AJA grants the publishing law review
a one-year exclusive license to publish an article and allows the author to
retain ownership of the copyright. 231 Other legal academics, including
Mark Lemley of Stanford Law School, developed their own forms of nonassignment publication licenses.232 In 2005, Professors Michael Carroll and
Dan Hunter initiated the Science Commons Open Access Law Program,
which also developed an Open Access Model Publishing Agreement and
promoted limited-duration exclusivity for law review publishing. 233 In
2008, the directors of the libraries of twelve major U.S. law schools met in
Durham, North Carolina and adopted the Durham Statement on Open
Access to Legal Scholarship.234 Among other things, the Durham Statement
“urge[d] faculty members to reserve their copyrights to ensure that they …
can make their own scholarship available in stable, open, digital
formats.”235 The Durham signatories recommended that the AALS model
publishing agreement be used to achieve this end.
These efforts have had a significant impact on the legal publishing
market. According to one study, by 2009 only twenty-two percent of law
reviews requested an assignment of copyright. 236 Thirty-three percent
requested an exclusive license, most of which were time-limited, and fortyfive percent only requested a non-exclusive license.237 According to this
study, many law review publishing agreements resembled either the AALS
or Science Commons model agreements, further indicating the influence of
the law professors’ efforts over industry practices.238
The experiences described above suggest that norms pertaining to
the terms of legal agreements, and academic publishing agreements in
particular, can be changed with effort and determination. Thus, just as legal
academia has effected a significant shift in the law review publication
market, it is possible that scientific publishers may be persuaded to adopt
new norms of publishing that are more responsive to the needs of the
Bari Burke, Memorandum 98-24 to Deans of Member and Fee-Paid Schools re.
Model
Author/Journal
Agreement
(May
18,
1998)
(available
at
http://www.aals.org/deansmemos/98-24.html#1).
231 Burke, supra note 230.
232 Lemley, supra note 229.
233
See
Science
Commons,
Open
Access
Law
Program,
http://creativecommons.org/science/literature/oalaw/ and Carroll – Open Access
Law, supra note 228, at 754-55.
234 Durham Statement on Open Access to Legal Scholarship (Nov. 7, 2008) (available
at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/durhamstatement).
235 Id.
236 Keele, supra note 228, at 274.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 276.
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scientific community.239 To this end, the recent mathematicians’ boycott of
Elsevier240 has demonstrated that even the largest publishers will respond to
their customers (and content providers) when they demand it.

F.

Broader Implications - Latency Beyond Science

While it is the primary aspiration of this paper to offer a proposal to
address the serials crisis in scientific publishing, I also hope that the
methodology and general approach presented herein may have some
applicability to fields beyond the sciences that are subject to similar
intellectual property uniformity costs. Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg
identify several fields in which “commons” of intangible assets have been
created.241 One of these is garage band music. Musical compositions are
protected by copyright in much the same way as scientific publications.
Despite outward appearances, there are a number of similarities between the
structures of the music industry and the scientific publishing industry: both
involve the creation of works by a large number of disaggregated producers,
both are dominated by intermediaries (music publishers/record labels and
journal publishers) that obtain exclusive rights to distribute those works,
both sets of intermediaries have traditionally performed selection, qualitycontrol and distribution functions, and both industries are undergoing
radical change due to the advent of digital technologies. It could also be
argued that the long duration of copyright and the near-absolute control
over musical content exercised by music publishers/record labels creates
social welfare losses and lessens content production: uniformity costs in a
different guise.
It is possible that the lessons learned, and the approaches adopted, in
the scientific publishing industry could be relevant to the far larger market
for music. Could private ordering solutions – new forms of limitedduration, latency-based music publishing agreements or recording contracts
– yield welfare-enhancing results? A full analysis of private ordering
arrangements within the music industry remains to be conducted along the
lines that I have outlined here, but it would not be surprising if such an
analysis revealed the emergence of latency periods in certain contexts.242
I recognize, of course, the significant differences between the legal and scientific
publishing industries, including the fact that most law reviews are student edited
publications that are financially supported by law schools, rather than stand-alone
commercial publishing enterprises. Nevertheless, I believe that the shift in norms at
law reviews is, at the very least, informative to the discussion of scientific publishing.
240 See notes 1-4, supra, and accompanying text.
241 Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 203.
242 Eric Priest offers one possible example from the music industry in China, where
free copies of most songs become available on file sharing sites soon after they are
released. Record labels have been relatively unsuccessful in preventing widespread
copying by enforcing their copyrights. Thus, according to recent reports, Chinese
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And the need for alternate models of allocating rights will only become
more important as composers increasingly seek to build on prior work
through sampling, remixing and mashing, much as scientists build upon the
work of their predecessors.243

CONCLUSION
The serials crisis in scientific publishing can be traced to the long
duration of copyright protection and the assignment of copyright by
researchers to publishers. Over-protection of scientific literature has
enabled commercial publishers to increase subscription rates to a point at
which access to scientific information has been curtailed with negative
social welfare consequences. The uniformity costs imposed by such overprotection can be addressed by tailoring intellectual property rights, either
through legal change or private ordering.
Current open access channels of distribution offer alternative
approaches to scientific publishing, but neither the Green OA self-archiving
nor the Gold OA author-pays models has yet achieved widespread
acceptance. Moreover, recent proposals to abolish copyright protection for
academic works, while theoretically attractive, may be difficult to
implement in view of current legislative and judicial inclinations. Likewise,
funder open access mandates such as the NIH OA Policy, which are already
responsible for the public release of millions of scientific articles, suffer
from various risks and political uncertainty.
In this paper, I propose an alternative private ordering solution based
on latency values observed in open access stakeholder negotiation settings.
Under this proposal, research institutions would collectively develop and
adopt publication agreements that do not transfer copyright ownership to
publishers, but instead grant publishers a twelve-month exclusive period in
which to publish a work. This limited period of exclusivity should enable
the publisher to recoup its publishing costs and a reasonable profit through
subscription revenues, while restoring control of the article copyright to the
author at the end of the exclusivity period. This approach would also
complement and facilitate compliance with existing institutional and funder
open access mandates. The balanced approach proposed in this article
addresses the needs of both publishers and the scientific community, and
record labels have reached informal agreements with online search giant Baidu that
would prevent users from using Baidu to search for a song during the first two weeks
after its release, when labels make the majority of their revenue from the song. In
exchange, the labels would relax their enforcement efforts against Baidu. In this
highly dynamic market, two weeks may be an optimal latency period.
243 See, e.g., KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE – THE LAW AND CULTURE
OF DIGITAL SAMPLING (2011) (describing significant market failures in the digital
sampling of music).
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would, I believe, avoid many of the challenges faced by existing open
access models.

